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THE FAIRNESS DIMENSION IN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Mark W. Cordes*

I. INTRODUCTION

Takings jurisprudence has long been a notoriously murky area of law,
with both courts and commentators noting the indeterminate nature of the
inquiry.' Beginning with the seminal decision of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
where the Supreme Court first recognized that a land-use restriction that "goes
too far" might constitute a regulatory taking, 2 the Supreme Court has struggled
to provide meaningful guidance in resolving the takings puzzle.
Three decisions in the past decade-Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,3 TahoeSierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,4 and Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.'-have clarified, to a certain extent, the Court's

regulatory takings method, if not necessarily the outcome of particular cases.
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra established a two-step inquiry for the typical
takings challenge to a land-use restriction. First, if the restriction deprives the
landowner of all economic viability then it will be deemed a categorical taking
under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.6

Second, assuming some

* Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
1. Numerous commentators have noted the lack of clarity in takings jurisprudence. See,
e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22
ECOLOGY L. Q. 89, 102 (1995) ("an unworkable muddle"); John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a
Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2003) (consensus that takings law "is highly
muddled"); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking "Justice and Fairness" Seriously: DistributiveJustice and
the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 569 (2007) ("a muddle"); Andrea L. Peterson,
The Takings Clause: In Search of UnderlyingPrinciples, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1303-04 (1989)
("doctrinal and conceptual disarray"). But see Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer For
the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 371 (2007) (stating that although commentators will
continue to criticize takings law as "muddled" and "incoherent," the law has been clarified to
some extent in recent years permitting more predictability than in the past).
2. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (t922).
3. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001).
4. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342
(2002).
5. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
6. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992). The one exception to
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economic viability remains, the courts should analyze the restriction under the
three-factor Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York balancing

test. This test weighs the following factors: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation; (2) the degree of interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the government actions.7 The Court
suggested this interplay between Lucas and Penn Central in Lucas itself,8 but it
is more explicitly addressed in Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra.
Lingle further clarified takings analysis by rejecting any means-ends test
as part of the takings equation thereby eliminating the "substantially advance
legitimate state interests" test previously established in Agins v. Tiburon'o and
later applied in a number of opinions." The Lingle Court clarified that the
"substantially advances" standard is grounded in substantive due process, not
takings concerns, and it candidly acknowledged that repetition of the
"substantially advances" test in previous takings cases was a mistake.' 2 The
Court therefore recognized the two-step Lucas-Penn Central as the sole basis
for analyzing regulatory takings.13
Taken together, these three cases, in addition to clarifying takings
analysis, have two important consequences. First, as noted by a number of
commentators, they in effect establish the ascendency of Penn Central as the
primary vehicle for takings analysis.14 Although affirming that regulations that
deprive owners of all economic viability will be considered a categorical
taking under Lucas, the cases indicate, as Lucas did, that this category of
Indeed, both Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra
takings is exceedingly rare."
this categorical taking is where a regulation prohibits what would have constituted a common law
nuisance. See id. at 1029-31.
7. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
8. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
9. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330, 342; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18
(2001).

10. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
11. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470,485 (1987).

12. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005).
13. See id. at 542-43, 548. The Court has recognized two other tests for takings in two
distinct contexts. First, the Court has held that government action that results in a physical
invasion of land is per se unconstitutional, with few exceptions. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435, 437 (1981). Second, when government makes
development approval contingent upon a landowner providing exactions in the form of a physical
dedication of land, the Court requires that there be both an "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" between the required exaction and the impact of the proposed development. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 386, 391 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.

1, 7 (2008) (the "lodestar of regulatory takings jurisprudence"); John D. Echeverria, Making
Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171, 173-74 (2005); Meltz, supra note 1,
at 333 (except for per se takings, "Penn Central reigns triumphant").
15. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Regulatory Takings
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rejected Lucas's categorical takings claims in such ways as to indicate that
even very limited economic viability is enough to avoid a categorical taking.' 6
As a result, almost all takings challenges are ultimately decided on the basis of
the Penn Centralbalancing test.

Second, the three decisions confirmed that the takings question ultimately
concerns "fairness and justice,"" and that courts should apply the Penn
Central test in this light.' 8 In one sense, this was nothing new, since the Court
has long affirmed that "fairness and justice" is at the heart of the takings
inquiry. This was first suggested in Pennsylvania Coal, where the Court
concluded its opinion by stating that "the question at bottom is upon whom the
loss of the changes desired should fall."' 9 The same point was made again, but
with greater clarity, in Armstrong v. United States where the Court stated that
the Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole." 20 This language from Armstrong has been repeated
in various later decisions, typically as a prelude to an elaboration of applicable
takings standards. 2'
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra again referred to Armstrong, but with greater

emphasis. In Palazzolo, the Court stated that the Penn Central test is to be
"informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the
government from 'forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 22
Similarly, in deciding whether to apply a categorical rule or the Penn Central
balancing test to determine whether a temporary moratorium constituted a
taking, the Court stated in Tahoe-Sierra that "the ultimate constitutional
question" was which of the two approaches better served "the concepts of
'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause."23
The Lingle Court also stressed the centrality of "fairness and justice" in

Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
523, 547 (1995) (surveying state courts after Lucas and concluding that "they rarely find" the
economic viability condition to be met).
16. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
330 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
17. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34, 342; Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 617-18. See also Davidson, supra note 14, at 34-37 (suggesting that in recent years,
equality norms reflected in the Armstrong "fairness and justice" principle, have emerged as the
principal consideration in takings analyses).
18. Pallazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
19. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
20. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
21. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong, 364
U.S. at 49); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 24 (1978) (quoting
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
22. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
23. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y

4

Vol. XX:1 2010

Takings Clause analysis, twice quoting the Armstrong language.2 4
Significantly, the Court, in rejecting a means-ends test as part of takings
analysis, discussed the underlying values behind both substantive due process
and takings. In addition to noting that the Agins "substantially advances" test
was clearly "derived from due process, not takings, precedents," the Court
stated that it was ill suited to the underlying values of the Takings Clause.25 In
particular, the "substantially advances" test asks whether a regulation is
effective, whereas the takings inquiry is concerned with "the magnitude or
characterof the burden . .. upon private property rights," and how burdens are

"distributedamong property owners." 26 As the Court noted:

A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on
property rights, or how that burden is allocated, cannot tell us when
justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers
through the payment of compensation. The owner of a property
subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state
interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner
of a property subject to an ineffective regulation. 27
Therefore, resolution of the, at times elusive, takings issue is ultimately
about fairness and justice. 28 Indeed, the admittedly ad hoc and indeterminate
nature of the Penn Central test reflects this central concern. Clearly, brightline rules do not easily achieve fairness because fairness requires flexibility to
adapt to the unique concerns presented by any situation. This seems to be one
of the virtues of the admittedly indeterminate Penn Central test. The TahoeSierra Court said as much, noting that since the "concepts of fairness and
justice" are themselves indeterminate, it makes sense to eschew any set
formula, and instead rely upon Penn Central, in which outcomes depend upon
the particular circumstances of each case.29
But how does a court go about determining fairness in any given
situation? As noted by Nestor Davidson, both the Penn Central test itself, as
well as notions of "fairness and justice," are hardly meaningful guideposts to
assess whether a restriction constitutes a regulatory taking. 30 Fairness, like
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537, 542-43 (2005).
Id. at 540.
See id. at 542.
See id. at 543.

28. Lower courts have affirmed this focus. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503
F.3d 1266, 1278 (2007) ("The focus of the regulatory takings analysis is on fundamental
fairness-is it fair for the government to impose the cost of a regulation on private parties rather
than on the public as a whole through public spending?").
29. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321, 336 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring)).
30. See Davidson, supra note 14, at 20-21. See also Meltz, supra note 1, at 311 (stating

that the Armstrong quote is of "little substance," but does caution courts not to rely solely on
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beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder. When is it fair to require individual
landowners to shoulder costs, and when do costs become disproportionate
enough to shift the regulatory burden to government?
As indeterminate as "fairness and justice" is, it is clear from the Supreme
Court's takings jurisprudence that the vast majority of regulatory costs and
burdens must be borne by individual landowners as part of living in a heavily
regulated society. This was first suggested in Pennsylvania Coal, where the
Court said, "[glovernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law."31 The subsequent development of takings doctrine indicates
that the extent referred to in Pennsylvania Coal is very great. Indeed, both
Supreme Court and lower court cases indicate the vast majority of economic
burdens, even substantial ones, must be borne by individual property owners
rather than shifting the cost to the public through payment of just
compensation.32
In other words, fairness and justice permit imposing
substantial regulatory costs upon landowners, and it is only in rare instances
that such costs should be shifted to the public.
This Article will examine the "fairness" dimension of takings
jurisprudence from both the macro and micro perspectives. First, it will show
why it is fair to generally strike the balance so that most costs must be borne
by landowners. This is termed the macro-fairness issue. Despite the ad hoc
nature of current takings analysis, the big picture is clear: most economic costs
must be borne by the individual landowner. This is true even when the
diminution in property value is fifty percent or more. 33
The second dimension of fairness is the micro-fairness issue. Microfairness addresses under what circumstances "fairness and justice" dictate
shifting the regulatory cost to the public through just compensation. As noted
above, the Supreme Court assumes fairness concerns are incorporated into the

mechanical rules and that results should seem fair and just).
31. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
32. See, e.g., Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding an 89.5% diminution in value is not a taking); Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d
432, 435, 438 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (finding a 52.6% diminution in value is not a taking);
Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1386, 1388-90 (N.J.
1992) (finding a 92% diminution in is value not a taking). See generally Eric Freyfogle, The
Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 87-88 (1995) (noting that in
wetlands contexts, courts typically reject takings claims even where diminution in value exceeds
50%); Meltz, supra note 1, at 335 (discussing need for large loss in value before taking found).
33. See, e.g., Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (59.7%
diminution in value not a taking); Pace, 808 F.2d at 1031 (finding an 89.5% diminution in value
not a taking); Nasser, 671 F.2d at 435, 438 (finding a 52.6% diminution in value not a taking);
Bernardsville,608 A.2d at 1386, 1388-90 (finding a 92% diminution in value not a taking). See
generally Freyfogle, supra note 32, at 87-88 (noting that in wetlands contexts, courts typically
reject takings claims even where diminution in value exceeds 50%); Meltz, supra note 1, at 335
(discussing need for large loss in value before taking found).
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Penn Central balancing test. 34 While this is generally true, this Article
explores how the test incorporates fairness, and what types of fairness concerns
should direct its application. Whereas the idea of "collective responsibility"
largely explains the macro-fairness issue, concerns about "ganging up" and
"being blindsided" largely control the micro-fairness issue.
This Article's analysis is divided into three parts. Part II will begin by
briefly reviewing the development of regulatory takings doctrine. Part III will
then look at the macro-fairness issue; why fairness permits and even requires
that most costs of land-use restrictions, even substantial ones, be borne by
affected landowners rather than shifted to the public. Finally, Part IV will
examine micro-fairness concerns and when fairness and justice suggest a
regulatory taking has occurred, shifting costs from affected landowners to the
public.
II. REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

The concept of a regulatory taking first emerged in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, where the Court struck down a state statute that had the effect of
requiring coal companies to keep a portion of coal in the ground to avoid
subsidence damage to surface structures. 35 While recognizing that government
could not function if it had to pay every time its regulations diminished land
values, 6 the Court held that a taking occurs "if regulation goes too far."37 In
making this assessment, the Court said diminution in value of the property was
a factor, but failed to clarify how that is determined other than to say that
"[w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude" a taking occurs. 38 The Court
concluded that the regulation in question had gone too far. The Court offered
little explanation on how it reached its conclusion other than stating that the
statute made the mining of anthracite coal "commercially impracticable." 39
The idea that regulatory takings are about distributional fairness is
implicit in the Court's analysis. The Court noted in several places that takings
questions do not concern the validity of government objectives; they are about
who should bear the cost of regulations. The Court stated "strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."40 The
Court concluded its opinion by stating "the question at bottom is upon whom
the loss of the changes desired should fall." 1 Additionally, the Court stated
34. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 336 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
35. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412-13, 416.
36. Id. at 413.
37. Id. at 415.
38. Id. at 413.

39. Id. at 414-15.
40. Id. at 416.
41. Id.
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that where private persons or communities choose to take the risk to acquire
only surface rights they should not be given greater rights than they bought.42
Despite PennsylvaniaCoal's recognition of a regulatory taking if land-use
restrictions "go too far," in the years after Pennsylvania Coal, courts had little
difficulty recognizing the legitimacy of most land-use restrictions, even when
they imposed substantial economic losses on landowners. Indeed, zoning-the
quintessential land-use restriction-exploded nationwide in the years
immediately following Pennsylvania Coal.43 Just four years later, the Supreme
Court itself upheld the constitutionality of zoning in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., a case involving a seventy-five percent diminution in land value.4 For
more than half a century after Euclid, lower courts consistently upheld typical
land-use restrictions notwithstanding the economic impacts they imposed, with
the Supreme Court largely leaving review of land-use restrictions to the
states.45
It was not until 1977, in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New

York, that the Supreme Court again took an in-depth look at a land-use
restriction.46 Penn Central involved a challenge to New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law.4 7 Through that law, New York City designated
Grand Central Terminal, owned by Penn Central, as a "landmark." 48 This
designation meant that a Landmark Preservation Commission had to approve
any exterior changes to the building, even if the changes were consistent with
any applicable zoning regulations. 49 Penn Central sought approval of two
alternative plans to build either a fifty-three or fifty-five story addition to the
building, both of which met current zoning requirements.so The Commission
rejected both plans on the grounds they would aesthetically denigrate the
Penn Central claimed the rejection effectively eliminated or
landmark."
greatly reduced the previously existing and very valuable air rights that it
52
owned. Penn Central challenged the application of the law as a taking.

42. See id. at 415.
43. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS, 209-10 (6th ed. 2005).

AND

CONTROL

OF

LAND

44. See Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390, 397 (1926).
Although Euclid was a substantive due process and not a takings case, the Court has at times used
Euclid as demonstrating large diminutions in value do not necessarily constitute a taking. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
45. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 115 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that after Supreme Court's decision in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Supreme Court did not decide another zoning case for about
40 years, leaving to state courts resolution of land-use issues).
46. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107.
47. Id at 115.
48. Id. at 115-16.
49. See id. at 112.
50. Id. at 116-17.
51. See id. at 117-18.
52. Id. at 119.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that it had previously
eschewed any "set formula" for analyzing takings, preferring instead to
"engage in essentially ad hoc inquiries."" It then identified several relevant
factors used in deciding takings decisions, including the economic impact of
the regulation, the degree of interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government action.54 The last concern
seemed to refer to the distinction between physical invasions, which are almost
always considered a taking, and mere regulations of land, which usually are
not.5s The Court then proceeded to address a number of specific arguments
raised by Penn Central," finally concluding that the landmark restriction did
not constitute a taking because Penn Central could still use the property for its
original purpose and that a reasonable return was available on the land.57
The Court's analysis in Penn Central was far from clear, with the Court
making little attempt to apply its three-part test in any systematic manner.
However, three observations can be made. First, in evaluating the economic
impact of a regulation, the regulation's impact on the parcel as a whole must be
considered, and not just on the segment of the property subject to the
regulation. Thus, the Court rejected Penn Central's attempt to focus only on
the air rights when assessing the economic impact." Second, the Court took a
generous view of the law's reciprocity of advantage, rejecting the idea that
Penn Central was being singled out for unique regulatory burdens, a position
vigorously argued by the dissent.59 Instead, the Court saw the Landmark Law
as part of a broad regulatory effort, which not only burdened but also
benefitted Penn Central.60 Finally, the Court strongly suggested that there was
little interference with Penn Central's investment-backed expectations, since
the Landmark Law did not prevent Penn Central from using the property for its

53. See id. at 124.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 128-35 (rejecting arguments that the Landmark Law was a taking because it
had taken all of the airspace, a valuable property right; that it singled out Penn Central, resulting
in a large diminution in value of its property; that the Landmark Law lacked significant
reciprocity of advantage; that the Landmark Law was inherently subjective and thus arbitrary; and
that the Landmark Law appropriated Penn Central's property for a government purpose).
57. See id. at 136.
58. Id. at 130-31 (stating air rights cannot be segmented from the rest of the property when
analyzing economic impact, but must consider the "parcel as a whole").
59. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Landmark Law was unconstitutional
because it lacked the normal reciprocity of advantage common to most land-use regulations,
instead singling out a few landowners for significant burdens. He said such a singling out is
justified only if the land-use restriction was controlling nuisance-like actions, which the
Landmark Law did not. See id at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 133-35 ("Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City Council
that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both
economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole-which we are unwilling
to do-we cannot conclude that the owners of the terminal have in no sense been benefitted by the
Landmarks Law.").
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original purpose as purchased. 61 For that reason, the Court said the Landmark
Law did not "interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel."6 2 Thus, even though the
Landmark Preservation Law in effect eliminated more intensive development
previously permitted by applicable zoning, the assurance of a reasonable return
and continuation of previous uses that formed earlier expectations negated any
takings concerns.
Penn Central marked the beginning of a renewed interest in regulatory
takings by the Supreme Court, with the Court issuing a number of significant
decisions over the subsequent three decades. 63 The 1980's saw a number of
decisions, beginning with Agins v. City of Tiburon in 1980, which articulated
the oft-repeated but misleading statement that a taking occurs if a land-use
restriction fails to substantially advance a legitimate government interest or
deprives the owner of all economic viability.6r During this time the Court
made little headway in clarifying when land-use restrictions go so far as to
constitute a taking. Rather, the Court addressed issues of ripeness, 65 remedial
relief when a taking has occurred,6 6 and under what circumstances a land-use
exaction requiring the physical dedication of property constituted a taking.67
Penn Central itself was all but ignored, partially because the cases did not
necessitate analyzing whether a land-use restriction as applied to a particular
property constituted a taking, and in part because the two-prong Agins test
61. See id. at 136.
62. Id.

63. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687
(1999); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., Cal., 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Cnty. of
Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
64. Agnis, 447 U.S. at 260.
65. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 340 (holding that denial of a 159-home residential
subdivision was not a taking because there was still the possibility that a less ambitious proposal
might be approved); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 172 (holding that a denial of a 476-unit
subdivision proposal was not a taking because claimant did not seek variances that might have
permitted development and did not seek compensation through state procedures).
66. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (1987) (holding that where a land-use restriction is
determined to constitute a taking, the state is required to pay just compensation during the time
the restriction was effective).
67. In two cases, Nollan and Dolan the Court addressed the issue of when land-use
exactions, which involve conditioning development approval upon the physical dedication of land
to the government, might constitute a taking. In Nollan, the Court held that at a minimum there
must be an "essential nexus" between the required dedication and the asserted state interest that
would justify denial of development approval in the first instance; otherwise the exaction
constitutes a taking. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. In Dolan, the Court further clarified the
required relationship, stating there had to be "rough proportionality" between the required
exaction and the adverse effects of development. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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seemingly had replaced Penn Central.
This began to change with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission,68 a 1992 decision that built upon the PennsylvaniaCoal and Penn

In Lucas, the plaintiff, David Lucas, owned two
Central decisions.
undeveloped beachfront lots, which permitted residential development at the
time he purchased them for $975,000.69 Subsequently, a coastal preservation
law was passed that had the effect of prohibiting development on the
properties.70 Lucas challenged the restriction as a taking. 71 The trial court
found that the restriction rendered the property "valueless," and therefore
constituted a taking.72 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
reasoning that even if the restriction left the property valueless, it was not a
taking because of the important public interests served.73
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that
although most takings are fact specific and essentially ad hoc in nature, it had
recognized two types of categorical takings in previous cases. 74 In such
instances, certain supporting facts establish a taking without a need to balance
First is where government physically
the respective interests involved.
invades or requires that another be permitted to invade the property of
another.76 In such situations a compensable taking is near automatic regardless
Second is "where [the] regulation
of the economic impact of the invasion.
use of [the] land."78 In
beneficial
or
productive
economically
denies all
justifying this categorical taking, the Court noted, "'in the extraordinary
circumstance' when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature
is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life."' 79
Furthermore, the Court stated that regulations depriving the owner of all
economic viability are, "from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of
a physical invasion," and carry with them a heightened risk that private

68. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
69. Id at 1006-07.
70. See id. at 1008-09.
71. Id. at 1009.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1009-10. The South Carolina Supreme Court relied on what was perceived to be
the U.S. Supreme Court's "nuisance" line of cases, such as Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), which arguably held that there is no taking when government regulates noxious activity,
no matter how great the economic loss to the landowner.
74. Id. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id The Court cited several examples of this type of taking, most significantly Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (law requiring landlords to allow
cable companies to place cables on rental properties).
78. Id
79. Id. at 1003 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
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property is being pressed into public service.o The Court limited this per se
taking by stating that the loss of all economic viability would not constitute a
taking if the regulation was merely preventing a common law nuisance.81
Importantly, in recognizing that the loss of all economic viability
constituted a categorical taking, the Court was careful not to preclude the
possibility of finding a taking when a restriction reduces but does not eliminate
economic viability. In a footnote, the Court stated that such a restriction might
still constitute a taking under the ad hoc balancing test established in Penn
Central.82 Although the Court did not clearly define how such a test might
operate, it quoted Penn Central, stating that "'the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and . . . the extent to which the regulation has

interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant to
takings analysis generally."83
Thus, the Court in Lucas brought Penn Central back into the fold,
establishing what might be viewed as a two-step test for analyzing whether the
economic impact of a regulation constitutes a taking. First, if the regulation
leaves the property owner with no economic viability it is a categorical taking
under Lucas, absent a finding that the prohibited use would have constituted a
common law nuisance. Second, if some economic viability remains, a court is
to analyze the restriction under the Penn Central factors, giving particular
attention to the regulation's economic impact and interference with
investment-backed expectations. The more recent cases of Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island8 4 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency85 confirmed this two-step Lucas-Penn Central analysis and

emphasized that at bottom the takings inquiry is a matter of "fairness and

justice."86

The primary issue before the Court in Palazzolo was whether acquiring
property with notice of a restriction precluded a takings claim, a position taken
by a number of lower courts. 87 The Supreme Court, however, emphatically

80. Id at 1018.
81. See id. at 1029-31.

82. Id. at 1019 n.8. Justice Stevens' dissent criticized the Court for adopting a rule that
provides relief for a total loss of economic viability, but no relief when the diminution in value is
95%. In response, the majority stated that such a loss might not constitute a categorical taking
under the "no economic viability" standard but the restriction would still be subject to the Penn
Central test, and might be a taking depending on the circumstances, under that formulation.
83. Id (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123).
84. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-34 (2001).
85. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002) (holding that Penn Central's ad hoc balancing approach was the proper
framework for analyzing whether a taking had occurred).
86. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
87. See, e.g., Avenel v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Hoeck v. City
of Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1995); Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 370-71
(Iowa 1994); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 291 (N.H. 1984).
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rejected such a position, stating that notice does not bar a takings claim.88 In
so holding, it stressed that unconstitutional regulations do not become
constitutional by the mere passage of time. 89 More importantly, it noted that
rejection of a notice rule was necessary to protect the rights of property owners
at the time a restriction was imposed; otherwise, they would lose the right to
sell their property at any reasonable value. 90
Although primarily focusing on the notice issue, the Court also clarified
its economic impact analysis in three ways. First, the Court affirmed what it
had suggested in Lucas: categorical takings based on a denial of economic
viability are limited to highly unusual and extreme facts and cannot be based
simply on a large diminution in value. The plaintiff in Palazzolo argued that
he had lost all economic viability, and thereby fell within the ambit of Lucas,
by comparing the profit potential of his property, $3,150,000, with the
minimum residual value, $200,000.91 The Court rejected the argument and
focused on what was left rather than what was lost. It stated that "a regulation
permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an eighteen-acre
parcel does not leave the property 'economically idle."' 92
Second, the Court clarified that if some economic viability remained, the
regulation must still be analyzed under the Penn Central balancing test. The
Court stated this clearly at the beginning of its analysis, "where a regulation
places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically
beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred depending on a
complex of factors." 93 The Court made the same point again at the end of its
opinion, where, even though it agreed that there was not a categorical taking
under Lucas, it nevertheless remanded the case for application of the Penn
Centralbalancing test.94
As a practical matter, remanding the case indicated that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court had only done half its job by affirming the two-step economic
impact analysis suggested in the Lucas footnote. Combined with its suggestion
that only very extreme facts will qualify for a categorical taking under the "loss
of all economic viability" test, the Court effectively made the Penn Centraltest
the final arbiter of almost all takings challenges.
Third, the Court said that the Penn Central test is to be "informed by the
purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from
'forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 95 As noted earlier, this

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-30.
Id at 627.
Id
See id at 616, 630-31.
Id at 631.
Id at 617 (quoting the Penn Central Test).

94. Id. at 632.

95. Id. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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"fairness and justice" principle had been repeated in a number of takings cases,
beginning with Armstrong v. United States.96 But Palazzolo seemed to give it
a more focused purpose, and, as such, a more intended use when analyzing
takings cases. It did not, of course, define or explain what "fairness and
justice" might mean.
Tahoe-Sierra built upon all three of these themes. The specific issue
before the Court was whether a temporary moratorium constituted a
categorical taking under the combined logic of Lucas and First English

97
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. First

English requires just compensation to be paid for the period between the
enactment of the regulation and the final determination that a taking
occurred.98 The Court noted that even if the restriction was subsequently
repealed, there had been a temporary taking that required just compensation.
Lucas, of course, said a complete loss of economic viability was a categorical
taking.99 Therefore, there was some rhetorical force to the argument that since
moratoria by their very nature prohibit all development for a temporary period
of time, they constituted a categorical taking, albeit a temporary one.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, and in doing so limited Lucas
categorical takings to extremely narrow facts thereby further reinforcing the
centrality of the Penn Centralbalancing test to takings analysis.' 00 The Court
began its analysis of Lucas by stressing that "loss of all economic viability"
means exactly that and retention of even a small amount of value avoids
finding a categorical taking. As stated by the Court, "[a]nything less than a
'complete elimination of value,' or a 'total loss,'
analysis applied in Penn Central."10 '

. . .

require[s] the kind of

The Court then analyzed the economic impact of the moratorium on the
affected properties, emphasizing that the restriction must be viewed in light of
the "parcel as a whole.""0 2 The Court had taken this position in earlier cases,
most significantly Penn Central, where it rejected the idea that a court should
only focus on the regulated portion of a property when evaluating economic
impact.' 03 in Tahoe-Sierra, the Court took the "parcel as a whole" approach a
96. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.

97. See generally First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A.,
Cal., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (concerning the question of whether compensation is an appropriate
remedy for a temporary taking, not whether or when such a taking has occurred).
98. See id. at 321.
99. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
100. Tahoe-Sierra v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
10 1. Id.
102. See id.at 330-32.
103. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31(1978). The
Court applied a similar analysis in Keystone, where it rejected attempts to define the regulated
property narrowly, instead emphasizing that the economic impact of a regulation must consider
the parcel as a whole, and not just the part subject to the regulation in question. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). The issue of how to define
the property in assessing a regulation's economic impact, often referred to as the "conceptual

14

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y

Vol. XX:1 2010

step further stating that "[a]n interest in real property is defined by the metes
and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that
Thus, in the same
describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest."'1
way a court must consider the entire geographic dimensions of a parcel when
analyzing economic impact, it must also consider the entire temporal
dimension when analyzing economic impact. As a practical matter, therefore,
only permanent deprivations of all value can constitute a categorical taking.
As stated by the Court, "a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted." 0 5 As a result, the Court concluded
that because a moratorium is only a temporary prohibition on development, it
did not deprive the owner of all economic viability and was not a Lucas
categorical taking.'0 6
Next, the Court examined whether the "fairness and justice" principle
underlying takings jurisprudence justified creating a new categorical rule for
moratoria, focusing primarily on three possible theories. It stated that "[w]ith
respect to these theories, the ultimate constitutional question is whether the
concepts of 'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause will be
better served by one of these categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry
into all the relevant circumstances in particular cases."' 0 7 The Court concluded
that "fairness and justice" supported a Penn Central inquiry, which turns on
the particular circumstances of cases, rather than creating a new categorical
rule. 08 In doing this, the Court made clear that it was not saying moratoria
could never constitute a taking either; rather, it was simply saying whether a
moratorium constitutes a taking turns on the particular circumstances of the
case, which is best determined by the fact-sensitive Penn Centraltest.' 09
Tahoe-Sierra essentially reinforced the same three themes seen in
Palazzolo. First, the Court again gave a very narrow reading to the Lucas
categorical standard, emphasizing that it requires "total," "complete," and "all"
loss of economic viability." 0 It reinforced this by "expanding the parcel as a
whole" analysis to include temporal as well as geographic dimensions."'
Second, as in Palazzolo, the Court clarified that land-use restrictions that do
not deprive owners of all economic viability must still be analyzed under the
severance" or "denominator" issue, has generated a significant amount of academic commentary.
See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
104. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id.

107. Id at 334.
108. See id at 334-37.

109. See id. at 342 ("we conclude, therefore, that the interest in 'fairness and justice' will
be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this,
rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule.").
I 10. Id
111. Id at 334.
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Penn Central balancing test to determine if there has been a taking. As a
result, Penn Central is the governing standard for determining whether a
regulation constitutes a taking. Finally, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra again
emphasized that the takings question was fundamentally about "fairness and
justice."" 2 Indeed, the Court's strong inclination to leave the final resolution
of the vast majority of takings questions to the Penn Centralbalancing test was
also predicated on the underlying value of "fairness and justice," the
indeterminate nature of which was best pursued by ad hoc, flexible balancing.
The Courts most recent pronouncement on regulatory takings, Lingle v.
Chevron, further clarified the takings inquiry and confirmed the centrality of
"fairness and justice."113 Lingle addressed a lingering question in takings
analysis, which was whether a means-ends test, similar to that found in
substantive due process, was also part of the takings inquiry. The root of the
problem was the Court's two-prong takings test articulated in Agins v. City of
Tiburon.l14 It stated that a zoning restriction constitutes a taking "if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . .. or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.""i5 A number of decisions
repeated this language in the 1980's and 1990's though the first prong was
never the basis for a decision." 6 But in Lingle both the district court and Ninth
Circuit used the first prong of Agins to find that a Hawaii rent control law
constituted a taking, holding the law failed to substantially advance the state's
asserted interest.' 17
The Supreme Court reversed, stating the "substantially advances" test
from Agins is not properly part of the takings inquiry, but rather belongs to
substantive due process." 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that
the substantially advances language is essentially a means-ends test designed
to determine "whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving
some legitimate public purpose."ll 9 This is relevant to the underlying purpose
of substantive due process, but is not relevant to the central concern of takings
jurisprudence, which focuses on the "fairness and justice" of imposing burdens
on property owners. In particular, the Court stated that the takings inquiry
concerns the magnitude of burdens and how they are distributed not whether
the regulation is effective.' 20 As the Court noted, "[t]he owner of a property
subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate interest may be just as
112. Id at 342.
113. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
114. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).

115. Id.
116. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987).
117. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533-36 (discussing district and circuit court opinions).
118. See id. at 545.
119. Id. at 542.
120. Id
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singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an
ineffective regulation."121
Lingle is important because it clarified the regulatory takings test, and in
particular it eliminated the "substantially advances" means-ends test. As such,
it reaffirmed the two-step Lucas-Penn Central analysis from Palazzolo and
Tahoe-Sierra, echoing the observation that the vast majority of regulatory
22
takings claims must be determined under Penn Central.1
Beyond that,
however, the Court also reiterated the guiding principle of "fairness and
justice." Not only did the Court specifically state the principle in several
places,'23 but its in-depth analysis of how takings concerns differ from
substantive due process highlights the fairness underpinnings of takings. In
particular, by emphasizing that takings are not concerned with the
effectiveness of a regulation, but rather the magnitude of burdens and how they
are distributed, 124 the Court pointed back to the fundamental takings inquiry:
who should bear the costs of regulation.
The past decade has seen the "muddled" area of regulatory takings
doctrine clarified to some extent, with the three-factor Penn Central test
emerging as the Court's dominant tool. Consequently, the Court has given
increased emphasis to the centrality of "fairness and justice" in deciding
takings cases. The following sections will examine the fairness component of
the takings inquiry.
III. THE BIG PICTURE: FAIRNESS AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

As noted above, current takings analysis reflected in the Penn Central
balancing test is ad hoc and somewhat indeterminate. Yet, the big picture
balance drawn by the Supreme Court and lower courts is quite clear:
significant economic impacts can be imposed on landowners without
constituting a regulatory taking.' 25 Diminutions in value in excess of fifty
percent are routinely upheld, and often even higher economic impacts are not
deemed to be takings.' 26 Indeed, as noted by several recent Court of Federal
Claims decisions, diminution in value must substantially exceed fifty percent
before any serious consideration is given of a Penn Central taking, and should
121. Id. at 543.
122. See id at 538 (stating that outside the "relatively narrow categories" of physical
invasions and loss of all economic viability, and the special case of exactions, "regulatory takings
cases are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central.").
123. See id. at 537, 542-43.
124. See id. at 542-43.
125. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 U.S. 1023, 1032 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding a 78% diminution in value not a taking); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d
1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (no taking under Penn Central after 78% and 92% diminution in
value on two parcels); Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 438 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding
a 53% diminution in value not a taking); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville,
608 A.2d 1377, 1386-90 (N.J. 1992) (finding a 90% diminution in value not a taking).
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be closer to ninety percent.127 In other words, regulatory takings are the rare
exception and not the rule. Thus, according to the Court's own terms,
imposing significant costs on landowners is almost always "fair and just."
Justice Holmes' observation in Pennsylvania Coal that government could
hardly go on if it had to pay every time its regulations reduced the value of
land may explain why the regulatory takings bar is so high. 128 In other words,
once we assume that restrictions on land use are necessary for society, then we
must tolerate some negative impacts for the greater good. In many instances
this is easy to accept because of a clear "reciprocity of advantage" from the
restriction.129 This is most clearly seen in typical zoning restrictions, such as
single-family residential, where a broad class of landowners receive reciprocal
benefits and burdens.
But the Court's "big picture" acceptance of imposing economic impacts
on landowners goes far beyond typical zoning restrictions and includes other
land-use restrictions that impose large economic impacts on landowners, often
without the clear reciprocal benefits seen with zoning restrictions. This is
perhaps most apparent with restrictions on environmentally sensitive lands
such as wetlands, open-space, habitat for endangered species, coastal zones,
and farmland. By necessity, such restrictions substantially reduce or altogether
eliminate development opportunities on the property, often resulting in
substantial diminution in value. Moreover, most of the benefits of such
restrictions typically go to broader society rather than to the immediate
neighbors as often occurs with typical zoning restrictions.13 0
127. The Court of Federal Claims itself stated it had "generally relied on diminutions well
in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking." Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl.
337, 357 (2006). The court also held that a 59.7% diminution in value was insufficient to find a
taking under Penn Central. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271-72 (2001). In
reaching that conclusion the court reviewed a number of decisions from the Supreme Court,
Federal Circuit, and Court of Federal Claims where economic impact and diminution in value
were considered. It noted that the Supreme Court suggested several times that diminutions
"approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily" constitute a taking. Id. at 271 (citing Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding a zoning ordinance valid despite a 75
percent diminution in value)); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (finding no
taking despite an 87.5% diminution).
128. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
129. Pennsylvania Coal recognized "reciprocity of advantage" as a rationale for upholding
land-use restrictions, and has noted it in a number of subsequent decisions. Id. at 415. See, e.g.,
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n, v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262
(1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
130. For example, farmland preservation efforts, which often use agricultural zoning to
preclude development on farmland, are typically designed to further broader societal concerns,
including food security, environmental amenities, and control of sprawl. See Mark W. Cordes,
Takings, Fairness, and Farmland Preservation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1033,

1041-45 (1999).

Similarly, wetland protection is designed to preserve the environmental benefits of wetlands, such
as water purification, flood control, and habitat for fauna and wildlife, all of which go to broader
society. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 695 (5th ed. 2006) (describing the benefits of preserving wetlands).
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Courts in the vast majority of these cases have rejected regulatory takings
challenges thereby putting the regulatory burden on affected landowners.' 31
This might strike the average person as unfair. Indeed, the individuals within
the property rights movement and others have often lamented the inherent
unfairness and injustice of such regulations arguing that if the benefits of such
restrictions go to society as a whole then the cost of such restrictions should be
placed on society as well, at least when a land-use restriction results in
substantial decrease in value.1 32
An initial question, therefore, is why do "fairness and justice" generally
support a balance in which the vast majority of costs must be borne by
landowners, even those imposing large diminution in value with limited
reciprocal benefits? The answer is the macro-fairness issue and it explains the
fairness of a system that is heavily weighted in favor of government regulatory
efforts. It also necessarily serves as the backdrop to the Penn Central test,
which essentially asks when "fairness and justice" requires an exception to the
big picture balance in favor of government.
The following section will examine three rationales why such land-use
restrictions are not inherently unfair, even in cases of extreme diminution in
property values. First is the idea of "givings," which recognizes that
government action creates a substantial portion of land value. Second is the
idea of general reciprocity, which recognizes that from a broader perspective
some regulations adversely affect and benefit landowners. Finally is the
property rights themselves, which has long viewed private property interests as
being subject to the broader public welfare.
A. "Givings" and Fairness

Central to any fairness critique of environmental land-use controls is that
landowners suffer substantial economic loss in order to benefit the rest of
society. As a general matter, the more severe the diminution in value the less
fair the regulation appears, a point which the first prong of the Penn Central
seems to recognize. This presupposes that landowners have a valid claim to all
the market value of their property. Thus, land-use restrictions that greatly
reduce property values are seen as depleting a landowner's wealth to benefit
the public.
131. See, e.g., Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (59.7% diminution
in value not a taking). See also Freyfogle, supra note 32, at 87-88 (noting that in wetlands
contexts, courts typically reject takings claims even where diminution in value exceeds 50%).
132. See, e.g., Nancy G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response
to "Environmental Takings", 46 S. C. L. REV. 613, 636 (1995); Michael M. Berger, Dollars and
Damages: A Debate - Yes! It's the Fair Thing to Do, PLANNING, Mar. 1996, at 22-24. See also
Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 513, 514

(2005) ("[W]hat energizes the property-rights movement is primarily a sense of unfairness.").
For a recent discussion of the property rights movement see Christine A. Klein, The New
Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155,
1160-67 (2007).
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Recognizing that government activity added a substantial portion of value
to the land considerably lessens the perceived unfairness of loss value. This is
often referred to as government givings to highlight the fact that government
often gives significant value to land. 133 As such, the extent of true loss from
land-use regulations is far less than it might first appear.
Government actions add value to land in numerous ways. Two of the
most obvious examples are land-use restrictions themselves and infrastructure
support. Government land-use restrictions can increase property values in
several different ways. First, government regulations minimize the harms that
might otherwise affect landowners, especially those arising from incompatible
land uses. Thus, the very scheme of restricting property use adds significant
value to neighboring property. 134 Moreover, use restrictions can enhance land
value by limiting the supply of land for particular uses. All else being equal,
when the supply of a commodity is reduced its value increases.
Perhaps the most obvious example of government givings is the basic
infrastructure support that makes land developable in the first place. Almost
any infrastructure support, such as sewer lines and public facilities, adds
significant value to land by making necessary services available to the
property. Although property owners today often pay for some infrastructure
through exactions,' 35 such exactions reflect the cost of the infrastructure and
not the value it adds to the property.136 More significantly, exactions do not
attempt to recover the broader infrastructure support, such as roads, which
makes land developable, and without which commercial value would often be
negligible.
The potential impact of government givings on land values can be
illustrated by a simple example. 137 Assume a property owner has a tract of
remote land worth $10,000. The government then puts in a major highway
133. See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings

Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 187, 234-36 (1997). See also Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, Ill YALE L.J. 547 (2001) (cataloguing various types of government
givings and proposing a methodology to determine when recipients should be required to pay for
government givings).
134. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN G. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND

LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328-29 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing ways that government

action might create an increase in the value of property and defining them as "wind falls").
135. For a general discussion of how developers are increasingly required to pay for some

infrastructure costs through exaction requirements, typically in the form of land dedications and
impact fees, see ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ WITH ARNOLD M. HOwITT,

REGULATION FOR REVENUE 19-20, 35-39 (1993).

136. The Supreme Court's decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, established that "rough
proportionality" must exist between the required exaction and the adverse effects of development.
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). This in effect limits exactions to the societal costs created by a
proposed development, and is not necessarily related to the value added by the infrastructure
supported by exactions.
137. 1 have used this example in several previous writings. See Mark W. Cordes, The
Public/PrivateBalance in Land Use Regulation, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 689

(1998); Cordes, supra note 133, at 235-36.
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near the property, creating new commercial opportunities and raising the value
to $60,000 over several years. A short time later, the government imposes an
environmental restriction on the property, decreasing its value to $30,000.
Although it might initially appear to a landowner that government actions
diminished property values by fifty percent in this example, in fact the
cumulative effect was to increase the value three-fold.
Most real-life examples are not this clearly presented, but the basic point
it represents has substantial validity: government actions account for a
substantial part of any land value.' 38 This is not meant to ignore or minimize
the role of private enterprise in enhancing land values. Certainly property
values reflect substantial private as well as public initiative. But, it does
indicate that the loss of truly deserved land value is not nearly as great as it
might first appear. To the extent it does exist, it is often more attenuated and
should be seen in the context of the give and take of broader regulatory efforts.
B. Reciprocity and Distributional Fairness

Closely related to the idea of government givings is the concept of
reciprocity. Reciprocity also supports the general fairness of land-use
regulations. Although the Supreme Court has never fully explained the
concept, it has long emphasized that a reason for not requiring compensation
whenever regulation decreases land values is because the regulation will result
in an "average reciprocity of advantage."l 39
The concept of reciprocity has two aspects, what I have referred to as
specific and general reciprocity.140 Specific reciprocity is the reciprocal
burdens and benefits flowing from the actual regulation in question. This
138. Edward Thompson makes this same point in the context of the Lucas decision, noting
the various ways Mr. Lucas' property was enhanced by government "givings":
Whether or not one agrees with the decision in the case, the fact remains that both
Lucas' ability to build on the beach and the value of his beachfront lots were
augmented by government action. Public authorities had constructed a bridge to
provide access to the island, roads to drive on, water and sewage systems to serve the
houses, and beach protection measures to prevent them from washing away. On top of
that, the government has helped underwrite flood insurance to cushion the loss when
those measures fail. All of these taxpayer-financed improvements contributed to the
value of Lucas' property and in all likelihood spelled the difference between its being
attractive for development and a financially worthless strip of shifting sand. In effect,
much of the government's financial exposure for taking the Lucas property was
attributable to the government itself.
Edward Thompson Jr., The Government Giveth, ENvTL. F., March/April 1994 at 22, 22.

139. Noted first in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), the idea of
reciprocity as a rationale supporting land-use controls has been mentioned in a number of other
cases. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18
(1992); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341 (2002).
140. Cordes, supra note 130, at 1075-77; Cordes, supra note 133, at 236-37.
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appears to be the normal use of the phrase "reciprocity of advantage" in
Supreme Court decisions.141 For example, a broadly applicable land-use
restriction to single-family use will limit previously existing development
opportunities on a particular parcel of land, but it will also impose similar
limitations on surrounding land.142 Thus, each owner loses something (the
previous opportunity to develop) and gains something (the benefits of similar
restrictions on nearby land). As a practical matter, the benefits and burdens
from a specific regulation might not be evenly distributed, nor will the benefits
necessarily equal the burdens; yet, reciprocal benefits at least partially offset
losses imposed by the same regulation.
Reciprocity can also be viewed from a more general perspective, in which
the reciprocal benefits of regulatory life in general are considered.143 The
Supreme Court is arguably alluding to this general reciprocity when it states
that it is usually fair to assume that legislation is simply "adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life" to secure an "'average reciprocity of advantage'
to everyone concerned." 44 Thus, although a particular regulation might
decrease the value of a landowner's property, the same owner benefits from
numerous other regulations that restrict other parties. For example, an owner
whose property is subject to particular land-use restrictions might in turn
benefit from Clean Water Act restrictions on one neighbor, wetland controls on
a second, and floodplain restrictions on a third. More broadly, various other
types of economic and social regulations benefit the person economically.
Consequently, any serious discussion of regulatory fairness must
recognize the significant regulatory benefits that flow to landowners as a result
of other regulations. Focusing only on the burden caused by a particular
regulation distorts the regulatory equation, making government accountable for
burdens imposed, but not giving government credit for the benefits created.145
For all practical purposes, this line of reasoning makes almost all government
regulatory efforts vulnerable to charges of unfairness because when viewed in
isolation most regulations will burden some parties more than others. Viewing
benefits and burdens from a broader perspective helps to mitigate perceptions
of unfairness.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has not articulated the concept of
141. See Pa. Coal Co, 260 U.S. at 415 (1922) (distinguishing the statute before it from an
earlier case, in which a requirement that a pillar of coal be left along a line with adjoining
property was for the mutual benefit of both owners); Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 (noting that the large
lot restriction on single-family homes would provide reciprocity by a similar restriction on
surrounding property).
142. See, e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 263.
143. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 771-77
(1999) (discussing "long-term" reciprocity where benefits from other public actions are
considered).
144. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415); Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124.
145. See Dagan, supra note 143, at 771 ("Requiring compensation for every private burden
imposed ... reflects and inculcate in our local communities on atomistic social vision.").
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general reciprocity as such, it has at times stated that most regulatory burdens
must be borne "as concomitants of the advantage of living and doing business
in a civilized community."l 4 6 In stating this principle, the Court has made no
effort to identify reciprocal benefits from the challenged regulation, but instead
put regulatory burdens in a broader context. This is reciprocity stated at the
most general level but the point remains valid. There are enormous advantages
and benefits gained from doing business in America's regulatory framework,
and the burdens imposed by any particular regulation must be viewed in that
context. This applies to land development as well as other business
enterprises.147
The importance of viewing reciprocity from a broader perspective was
emphasized in a recent California Supreme Court decision. In San Remo Hotel
v. City of San Francisco, the court essentially endorsed the idea of general
reciprocity.148 In finding the ordinance in question constitutional, the court
rejected an argument that the law lacked reciprocity, stating:
[T]he necessary reciprocity of advantage lies not in a precise balance
of burdens and benefits accruing to property from a single law, or in
an exact equality of burdens among all property owners, but in the
interlocking system of benefits, economic and noneconomic, that all
the participants in a democratic society may expect to receive, each
also being called upon from time to time to sacrifice some

146. This idea was first articulated by Justice Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal where he
identified a number of previous cases where a taking was not found despite the absence of any
reciprocal advantage from the regulation, "unless it be the advantage of living and doing business
in a civilized community." 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In more recent cases the
Supreme Court has referred to this concept to indicate that most regulatory burdens must be
viewed in light of "the advantages of doing business in a civilized society." See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (stating that "such restrictions are the burdens we all
must bear in exchange for 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community"') (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (explaining that "most burdens consequent upon government
action undertaken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners as concomitants
of 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community."') (quoting Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)).
147. Professor Frank Michelman makes a similar point in his seminal takings article
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967), where he states:

Efficiency-motivated collective measures will regularly inflict on countless people
disproportionate burdens which cannot practically be erased by compensation
settlements. In the face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to believe that we
can arrive at an acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens associated with
collectively determined improvements will have been distributed "evenly" enough so
that everyone will be a net gainer.
Id. at 1225.
148. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 109 (Cal. 2002).
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advantage, economic or noneconomic, for the common good. 149
None of this suggests that the balance of burdens and benefits always
evens out over time. Nor is it meant to suggest that the idea of "general
reciprocity" should replace examining the degree to which a challenged landuse restriction might or might not provide some reciprocal benefits. As will be
discussed in Part IV, the extent to which a restriction provides some reciprocity
of advantage remains an important consideration in evaluating the "fairness
and justice" of a particular land-use regulation. It illustrates why from a big
picture perspective imposing substantial economic costs on landowners is not
inherently unfair. Any discussion of the fairness of a land-use restriction must
always be cognizant of the broader regulatory context, which tempers the
perceived unfairness of land-use restrictions viewed in isolation.
C. Property Rights and Landowner Expectations

A third rationale for why imposing economic costs, even substantial costs,
on landowners is not inherently unfair or unjust concerns the nature of property
rights and landowner expectations. The perceived unfairness of imposing
substantial economic costs on landowners is in part predicated on an expansive
view of property rights, one in which landowners have a right to engage in any
activities that do not constitute a nuisance.150 Thus, restrictions that limit or
preclude development are viewed as forcing landowners to forego
opportunities that are interwoven into their rights as property owners. The
forced loss of what some view as normal property rights without compensation
strikes many as unfair.
Although such a perspective admittedly has some intuitive appeal, it is
certainly not the only way, or even the traditional way, to view private property
interests. Rather, as noted by numerous scholars, property is a social construct
whereby society in essence recognizes and maintains property rights.'"' For
this reason, inherent in the state's creation of property is its ability to limit the
extent to which landowners can exercise their property interests for broader
social purposes. Indeed, property would not exist without the state and is thus
subject to certain implied limitations.

149. Id. at 109.
150. See Klein, supra note 132, at 1159 (noting how property rights advocates often use
"absolutist" rights language). See also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance
for Modern Takings Doctrines, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1253-56 (1996) (noting that property
rights arguments often predicated upon the incorrect idea that property rights were near absolute
during colonial period).
151. See, e.g., Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical
Contradiction?, 17 VT. L. REv. 647, 653-55 (1993); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of
Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM.
U.L. REV. 297, 361-63 (1990); John A. Humbach, Law and New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV.
339, 344-45 (1989).
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Taken to an extreme this would mean that all property is merely a
privilege granted by the state and subject to complete revocation, a position
never seriously considered in our law. Neither, however, has American
property law ever viewed property rights in the near absolute fashion often
envisioned by property rights advocates. Rather, American property law has
generally recognized that private property rights are subject to a broader public
interest. 152 This has often been referred to as the social function of property,
indicating that property ownership must be seen in a broader social setting with
responsibilities as well as rights.
This view of a social dimension of property has been inherent in
American understandings of property since the inception of this nation. For
example, in his in-depth study of land-use law during the colonial period, John
Hart states:
The first century and a half of private land ownership in America
reveals no sign of the later-imagined right of landowners to be let
alone as long as they do not harm others. In the minds of colonial
legislators, the bundle of property rights received by patentees and
passed on to their successors did not include a right to use the land
for everything short of a nuisance. Instead, the landowner's right to
control and utilize land remained subject to an obligation to further
important community objectives. Property ownership was 'not an
absolute right that exempted the individual owner from corporate
oversight,' but rather 'a right of stewardship that the ublic entrusted
to an individual, for both private and public benefits.' 53
Construing property interests in this manner recognizes that the use of
property inevitably extends beyond land boundaries and will often conflict
with other societal needs; thus, necessitating a reasonable accommodation of
interests. 154 Although fairness and the need to encourage investment in
property requires protection of private interests in many instances, it is
reasonable to view those private interests as ending when they inflict harm on

152. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L.

REv. 735, 751-52 (1985) (discussing restrictions on perceived noxious activity in early America);
Myrl L. Duncan, Property as Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for
Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENvTL. L. 1095, 1133-37 (1996)

(discussing types of restrictions on property use found in early America); Hart, supra note 150, at
1259-81 (discussing numerous public limitations on private property designed to further the
public good). See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing types of land-use restrictions in colonial period).
153. See Hart, supra note 150, at 1281 (quoting BARRY A. SHAIN, THE MYTH OF
AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 183
(1994)).

154. See Sax, supra note 132, at 513-14 ("Land-use laws reflect and help define a
community's standards as to what is acceptable between an owner and his neighbors and between
an owner and the larger community.").
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the broader public. Importantly, accommodation between private and public
interests is an inherent limitation in the bundle of property interests rather than
a deprivation of any rights.
A number of early judicial decisions demonstrate that this is an inherent
limitation of property ownership. When reviewing land-use restrictions to
protect the broader public interests, courts not only upheld such restrictions,
but they also consistently viewed them as inherent limitations in the property.
For example, in 1846 the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a statute that
had the effect of prohibiting owners of private beaches from removing any
sand or stone."' In recognizing a public interest sufficient to limit the use of
private beaches, the court stated "[a]ll property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be used as to injure the equal rights of others, or
to destroy or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community."l56
This sentiment also appeared in a number of other early cases where
Courts consistently
private land use conflicted with public interests.
recognized that private interests were not absolute and must yield to public
interests when conflicts arise. The recognition of inherent limits on private
property interests also appears in the widespread growth and acceptance of
land-use restrictions in the early part of this century. In recognizing the
validity of such restrictions, courts recognized that property rights are not
absolute but necessarily limited by the broader good. The Supreme Court itself
recognized this principle in a number of decisions during this period,
frequently stating that public interests limit property use.' 57
American law has long recognized that private property rights are not
absolute and are limited to a certain degree by the broader public interest. It is
important to emphasize that this is an inherent limitation in the nature of
private property rather than a deprivation of any preexisting rights. The nature
of the limitations will necessarily change over time as society itself changes
and comes to new understandings of how the broader public interest is best
defined.'1 8 In recent years this has included an increased awareness of the
155. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. 55 (1846).
see Duncan, supra note 152.

For a discussion of Tewksbury,

156. See Tewksbury, 52 Mass. at 57.

157. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (holding that private
property interests must at times "yield to the good of the community" for the sake of "progress");
Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (stating that private property
limited by other public interests, including exercise of the police power "to protect the
atmosphere, the water and the forests"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[A]ll
property in this country is held under an implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be
injurious to the community.").
158. See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Private Property, Public Rights, and the
New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 274-84 (1996). See also Klein, supra

note 132, at 1200-33 (discussing how new scientific and societal understandings indicate that
wetlands development, suburban sprawl, and global warming should now be considered
nuisances justifying land-use controls).
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environmental value of certain lands, such as wetlands, farmland, coastal
zones, and wildlife habitats, and how they serve the public interest in
previously unforeseen ways.
Thus, fairness concerns predicated on the deprivation of clearly defined
private property rights are misplaced. To the extent that public land-use
controls-including significant restrictions on environmentally sensitive
land-are designed to protect the public interest in a valuable resource, they
are simply asserting a limitation inherent in the property ownership. Certainly,
sensitivity to the impact on the private parties is called for in such situations,
but in discussing fairness it should not be viewed as taking an established right
from landowners.
For similar reasons, significant development restrictions on land that
result in a substantial diminution in value are not an unreasonable interference
with landowner expectations. As will be discussed more in Part IV, protection
of reasonable expectations is a central consideration in takings analysis, but
common understandings of property necessarily shape those expectations. As
noted by various commentators, reasonable expectations must take into
account the possibility of regulation to the extent that people perceive that
property is subject to certain public interests.' 59 The Supreme Court
recognized this in Lucas when it stated "the property owner necessarily expects
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers."' 60 As
noted by Professor Frank Michelman, "regulation [is] an ordinary part of
background risk and opportunity against which we all take our chances .. . as
investors in property."l61
Taken together, the three concepts of givings, general reciprocity, and the
nature of property rights help explain why, from a broad perspective,
government restrictions that substantially reduce property values are not
inherently unfair. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts consistently reject
regulatory takings challenges even when there is a large diminution in value.
Against this backdrop, the Penn Central test is designed to identify the
rare exception in which the "fairness and justice" calculus shift to the
landowner. The next section will examine this issue, discussing how the three
Penn Central factors help assess the "fairness and justice" of particular landuse controls, and in particular when they might justify shifting the cost to
government.

159. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27
URB. LAW 215, 227-37 (1995); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1449 (1993); A.
Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What is its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 555, 589 (1993).
160. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
161. Frank 1. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM
ENvTL. L.J. 409,415 (1995).
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IV. THE SMALL PICTURE: FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN APPLYING PENN
CENTRAL

As noted in Part 11, the Supreme Court's recent decisions establish the
three-prong Penn Central test as the basis for deciding the vast majority of
regulatory takings cases. These decisions also emphasized that the regulatory
takings inquiry is fundamentally about "fairness and justice" and must be
approached from that perspective.' 62 Indeed, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra viewed
the Penn Central test as uniquely suited to the idea of "fairness and justice,"
because the indeterminate nature of the test provides flexibility, which, in turn,
allows the Court to be sensitive to the particular circumstances of each case. 163
Moreover, the Court in Palazzolo explained that the Penn Central test itself
should be applied with an eye to the principles of "fairness and justice" that
underlie the Takings Clause.164
Part III discussed why the "big picture" of taking jurisprudence does not,
and should not, view a regulatory taking as inherently unfair when land-use
restrictions impose costs, often significant costs, on a relatively small set of
property owners. Land-use restrictions frequently impose disproportionate and
significant costs on property owners, and courts have consistently rejected
regulatory takings claims in the vast majority of cases; thus, implicitly finding
the regulations as "fair and just."
Therefore, the real question is under what narrow circumstances do
"fairness and justice" dictate shifting regulatory costs to society through just
compensation. As noted by the Court, there is no simple formulation to make
that determination and the final evaluation must turn on the particular facts of a
case.165 Arguably there are three aspects of "fairness and justice," all of which
relate in varying degrees to the Penn Centralformulation. First, fairness has a
vertical dimension, the severity or magnitude of economic impact. Second,
fairness has a horizontal dimension focusing on the distributional aspects of a
regulation. This might be characterized as the "ganging up" principle, the idea
that burdens should be evenly distributed and not just placed on a few for the
benefit of the many. Finally, there is a notice dimension to fairness, which
concerns changing the rules of the game midstream. This might be
characterized as the "blindsided" principle, the idea that it is potentially unfair
to impose unanticipated changes on landowners where there has been
162. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332, 336 (2002) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001) (O'Connor, ., concurring)); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S.
at 49).
163. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 336 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
164. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
165. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (concluding there is no
set formula for taking analysis, but instead "ad hoc, factual inquiries" (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
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substantial and reasonable reliance on previous understandings.
The following sections will explore how "fairness and justice"
considerations may help guide application of the three Penn Central factors.
Special consideration will be given to the three aspects of fairness identified
above. However, in examining each of these factors it is important to keep two
matters in mind. First, as just mentioned, the starting point for regulatory
takings analysis is that most regulatory burdens, even disproportionate and
substantial ones, will not constitute a taking. The Penn Central test is designed
to identify the exceptional case where "fairness and justice" require that the
regulatory cost shift to the public.
Second, the Penn Central analysis is a balancing test in which all three
factors are considered together.' 66 Only in very extreme cases, such as where a
regulation deprives an owner of all economic viability, will one factor be
enough to find a taking. Rather, the factors must be seen as component parts
working together. It is the sum total that must be considered. For that reason
there typically must be the convergence of two and perhaps all three factors
before the exceptional instance of a regulatory taking will be recognized.
Thus, the discussion of "fairness and justice" concerns under each of the
factors cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be understood as only one
component of the broader analysis.
A. The Economic Impact of a Regulation

The first Penn Central factor is the economic impact of a regulation. It is
rooted in Pennsylvania Coal, where the Court stated that diminution in value
was an important consideration in determining when a regulation had gone
"too far." 67 Additionally, the Court stated that when the impact of a
regulation reaches a "certain magnitude" it becomes a taking.'68 The focus on
the regulation's economic impact continued throughout the Court's subsequent
cases and found its culmination in Lucas.' 69
166. As noted by John Echeverria, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on how
the three Penn Central factors are to be "considered in relation to each other." He correctly notes
that they are not technically a balancing test, but instead states:
[T]he Penn Central analysis is more accurately described as a framework for analysis
rather than as a "test" yielding determinative legal answers. The Penn Central analysis
cannot be applied by mechanically toting up a "score" under each factor to arrive at an
overall evaluation. Rather, the Court appears to have in mind a more flexible approach
in which the persuasive force of each factor will vary with the facts of each case.
While a takings claim will presumably fail if all three factors point in favor of the
government, a takings claim can apparently succeed, depending upon the facts, even if
less than all of the factors point in favor of the plaintiff.
Echeverria, supra note 14, at 208.
167. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
168. Id. at413.
169. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that a regulation
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A focus on economic impact makes sense from the perspective of
fairness. All else being equal, regulations that result in severe economic
impacts on landowners will be viewed as less fair than those with modest
impacts. Small or modest economic impacts are more easily understood as the
cost one pays for participating in our economic way of life. They are also
more easily viewed as offset by regulatory benefits so that a fair exchange is
taking place. In contrast, severe economic impacts might be understood as
disproportionate to the problem posed or the benefit received, and also raises
the specter that government is seeking to essentially capture use of private
property without paying for it.
The Court in Lucas voiced both of those concerns by explaining why the
loss of all economic viability should be treated as a categorical taking. The
Court noted that in such a situation, "it is less realistic to indulge our usual
assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life' . . . in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of

advantage' to everyone concerned."l 70 The Court also noted that regulations
depriving an owner of all economic viability "carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." 1 71
Although these two concerns are most apparent in the rare instance when
a regulation deprives a landowner of all economic viability, they apply to a
certain extent when a regulation results in a severe but less than total
diminution in value. For example, an eighty to ninety percent loss in value
certainly raises fairness concerns that the regulation in question is not simply
adjusting benefits and burdens. Similarly, such a large loss might be viewed as
pressing the property into some public service, especially if the regulatory
benefits overwhelmingly flow to others. Though not inherently unfair, such
large losses are easily perceived as less fair than regulations with more modest
economic impacts.
Having said that, the Court has been clear that less than total deprivations
are not takings based on economic impact alone, and other factors are needed
to determine the unfairness of the regulation. Penn Central itself made this
point, stating that "diminution in ... value .. . alone" is never enough to be a
taking, noting that diminutions of seventy-five percent and higher had been
found to be constitutional.172 Lower courts have consistently affirmed that
large economic impacts alone do not constitute a regulatory taking.173 Thus,
that deprives a landowner of all economic viability will be considered a categorical taking).
170. Id. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
171. Id. at 1018.
172. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
173. See, e.g., Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(concluding there was no taking under Penn Central after 78% and 92% diminution in value on
two parcels); Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding
that a property reduced in value from $495,600 to $52,000 was not a taking); Nasser v. City of
Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 435, 438 (1lth Cir. 1982) (finding a 53% diminution in value was not
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though a significant or severe economic impact is almost certainly necessary to
be considered unfair and constitute a taking under Penn Central, it is not a
sufficient condition by itself.
An initial question in evaluating economic impact is what potential costs
should be considered. There is no question that diminution in land value is to
be considered. 174 But to what extent, if any, does fairness require that lost
profit potential also be considered? For example, a person might acquire land
zoned for high-density residential for the purpose of development and sale. If
prior to development the property is downzoned to low-density residential not
only will the value of the undeveloped land be substantially diminished, but the
anticipated profits have also been lost.
Although landowners often attempt to include lost profits as part of the
economic impact,17 it seems clear that fairness suggests consideration of
economic impact be limited to diminution in land value for two reasons. First,
potential profit is highly speculative with too many variables that can reduce or
eliminate the potential altogether. Moreover, land prices themselves reflect
market demand and profit potential. Thus, considering the diminution in land
value is a stand-in for reduced profit potential while simultaneously adjusting
for speculation.
Second, and more significantly, eminent domain proceedings only require
just compensation, meaning the fair-market value of property.17 6 Regulatory
takings are best viewed as those rare instances where regulations become the
"functional[] equivalent" of condemnation.17 7 Fairness simply requires that
landowners be made whole. What they had prior to regulation was the value of
the land; unrealized profit was only a possibility.'
A second question when assessing the magnitude of economic impact,
and thus its fairness, is how to define the parcel being regulated. This issue,
a taking); William C. Haas & Co. v. City of S.F., 605 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding no taking with a 95% diminution in value); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of
Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1386-90 (N.J. 1992) (finding no taking with a 90% diminution in
value). But see Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 340-41 (1990) (finding an 88%
diminution in value a taking); Friedenburg v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 767
N.Y.S.2d 451, 458-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (95% diminution in value a taking). See generally
Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 357 (2006) (stating that the Federal Court of Claims "has
generally relied on diminutions well in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking").
174. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). See also Penn Cent., 438 U.S.
at 124-25.
175. For example, in Palazzolo the regulated landowner tried to make a case for a "total
taking" by comparing the profit potential for the property ($3,150,000) with the minimum
residential value of $200,000. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001).
176. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 169-71 (Found.

Press 2002).
177. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); DANA & MERRILL,
supra note 176, at 87.
178. See also Echeverria,supra note 14, at 182 (discussing why lost profits should not be
considered in analyzing a regulation's economic impact).
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known as the denominator or conceptual severance issue, is central to a proper
assessment of economic impact. 179 Generally, the broader a parcel is defined
for purposes of analyzing a regulation's economic impact, the more minimal
the regulation's impact. Conversely, the more narrow the parcel, the greater
the regulation's economic impact. For example, if a landowner owns 100
acres of land, fifty of which are subject to an environmental regulation
prohibiting any development, should the regulation's economic impact be
measured against the entire 100 acres or only against the fifty acres being
regulated? If the parcel is defined as the 100 acres, then the economic impact
is likely substantial, but far from total. However, if the parcel is defined as
only the fifty acres being regulated, then the economic impact is near total.
The Supreme Court has on a few occasions suggested some uncertainty
on how to resolve this issue. s0 Furthermore, commentators have described the
issue as vexing, confusing, and troublesome. 81 Yet, speaking generally, the
Court has been quite clear in adopting a "parcel as a whole" approach to the
issue. This approach measures a regulation's economic impact not just against
the segment regulated, but also against the entire contiguous parcel held by the
affected landowner as a whole.1 82 To do otherwise would effectively turn
every regulation into a taking, which is inconsistent with any notion of
"fairness and justice."' 83 The Court first articulated this position in Penn
Central itself. Penn Central argued that the relevant unit of property for
analyzing the regulation's economic impact should be limited to the restricted
air rights. If the analysis could be limited to this segment of the property it
suffered a near total loss of value. The Court rejected this argument, instead
treating the relevant unit as the air rights together with the currently developed
parcel. The Court stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
179. A number of commentators have noted the importance of the denominator/conceptual
severance issue in assessing economic impact. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of
Environmental Law? LibertarianProperty, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in
the FederalCircuit,25 ENvTL. L. 171, 184 (1995); Michelman, supra note 147, at I192; Lynda J.
Oswald, Corneringthe Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in
Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 126-27 (1995); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-69 (1984).
180. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (describing it as a "difficulty," stating the Court has "at
times expressed discomfort" with the parcel as a whole approach (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992))); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7 ("Regrettably, the
rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its
precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value
is to be measured.").
181. See, e.g., DANA & MERRILL, supra note 176, at 136 (describing it as "[t]he most
vexing problem associated with diminution in value").
182. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
330-32 (2002); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-98 (1987);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
183. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497-99.
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segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular government action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . ...
.
The Court reaffirmed the "parcel as a whole" analysis in both Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,185 and Tahoe-Sierra, making

clear that property is not to be segmented but instead treated as a whole when
analyzing a regulation's economic impact.
Tahoe-Sierra in particular
solidified the "parcel as a whole" approach, applying it not only to spatial but
also temporal dimensions of the property.186 Lower courts have similarly
taken a "parcel as a whole" approach in analyzing a regulation's economic
impact. 1
The "parcel as the whole" approach to analyzing economic impact makes
logical sense and certainly comports with concepts of "fairness and justice."
This approach is consistent with typical views of land ownership and thus the
reasonable expectations of owners. Fairness and justice must certainly
consider not only what is lost to regulation, but also what is retained.
Regulations that permit landowners to retain significant use and development
rights do not raise the same fairness concerns as those that eliminate all or
almost all development.
Thus, the proper approach for analyzing a regulation's economic impact is
to consider the "parcel as a whole" of contiguous property subject to the
regulation,188 but in most instances not to include other, non-contiguous
properties owned by the affected landowner.'8 9 There will, of course, be
184. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
185. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497-99 (stating that any other approach would permit
landowners to argue that virtually any restriction constituted a taking).
186. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330-32.
187. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Brace v. United States, 72
Fed. Cl. 337, 347 (2006); Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 38
P.3d 59, 67-69 (Colo. 2001); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 580
(Mich. 1998); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996).
188. See Meltz, supra note 1, at 348 ("In practice, the pattern has been to include
contiguous plaintiff-owned land in the relevant parcel unless there is good reason to exclude it.").
189. In rare instances there will be valid reasons to include non-contiguous property as a
single unit for purposes of analyzing economic impact, such as where they are part of an
integrated development project. See Giovanella v. Conservation Comm'n of Ashland, 857
N.E.2d 451, 457-58 (Mass. 2006) (recognizing possible situations where non-contiguous parcels
treated as single unit). But generally, non-contiguous property without a connection to the
regulated parcel should not be included as part of the denominator. Certainly an argument could
be made that it would be "fair and just" to consider the broader property holdings, and perhaps
even wealth, of an affected landowner when determining the economic impact of a regulation.
From this perspective, a regulation with a dramatic economic impact on a discrete parcel of land
might nevertheless be fair and just when considered in light of other, unaffected properties owned
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occasional situations in which it will be less than clear how the relevant parcel
should be defined for measuring economic impact. 190 For example, if a
landowner obtained two adjacent properties from different owners at different
times, then at least in some circumstances they should be treated as separate
parcels for evaluating economic impact. Similarly, two tracts of land owned
by the same person but divided by a major highway or even a topographical
feature might be reasonably treated as separate parcels in some
circumstances.191
Thus, the starting point in analyzing the fairness and justice of a land-use
restriction is its economic impact, and in particular whether it creates a
significant economic loss. More modest economic impacts are best viewed as
simply part of the give and take of economic life, and are easily accounted for
by the ideas of government givings and reciprocity of advantage. Though a
large diminution in value is a necessary condition to find a taking, it is not
sufficient in itself, but must also be accompanied by other fairness concerns
under Penn Central.
B. Interference With Distinct, Investment-Backed Expectations

The second factor identified in Penn Central, and the one the Court
suggested was of particular importance, is the degree to which a regulation
interferes with "distinct, investment-backed expectations."' 92 Notwithstanding
the apparent importance the Court attributed to this factor, the Penn Central
decision itself gave only limited insights as to what this factor might mean and
subsequent decisions have offered little additional guidance. As a result, lower
by the landowner, whereas exactly the same dramatic impact on a parcel might be viewed as
unfair if that is the only property a person owns. Such an approach is predicated on the idea that
those with greater land ownership are better positioned to absorb harsh economic impacts on
single properties.
This position, despite some intuitive appeal, is highly problematic and, ultimately, neither fair
nor just. Most obvious is the enormous difficulty once the analysis moves beyond contiguous
property, of determining what properties count. More basic, though, is the inherent unfairness of
treating two landowners with comparable economic impacts on their regulated properties in very
different ways. The Supreme Court appears to have rejected such an expanded approach to
determining the denominator. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7
(1992).
190. See Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 348 (2006). Here the court identified five
relevant factors in making a "parcel as a whole" determination: (1) whether a property was treated
as a single income-producing unit; (2) degree of contiguity between interests; (3) dates of
acquisition; (4) extent to which the parcel has been treated as a single incoming-producing unit;
and (5) extent to which the regulated lands enhance the value of the remaining lands. Id. at 348.
See also Giovanella v. Conservation Comm'n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 456-59 (Mass. 2006)
(concluding there is a presumption of treating contiguous parcel as one, but listing a variety of
factors to consider in making final determination of what is relevant parcel).
191. See generally Meltz, supra note 1, at 348-51 (summarizing parcel as a whole analysis
and instances where courts might, in limited cases, exclude portions of land from the relevant
parcel for purposes of evaluating a regulation's economic impact).
192. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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courts and commentators have struggled to come to grips with its meaning,
frequently noting the ambiguous nature of the phrase.'93 Part of the problem is
determining a relevant baseline for what an investment in property means
because it can arguably relate to the initial investment in property when
acquired or to simply holding on to property.' 9 4
Notwithstanding these limitations, to a large extent this factor is about
interference with reasonable landowner reliance and in particular reliance on
current norms. Professors David Dana and Thomas Merrill, in discussing this
factor, put it this way: "it is clear that the degree to which the government
action reflects a sharp and unanticipated change in the permissible uses of
property is today a recognized factor in ad hoc takings analysis."' 9 5 Thus, to a
large extent this factor concerns being "blindsided" by changes in the law.
This is especially true when landowners have shown substantial reliance on
earlier rules.
Such an interpretation has much to do with fairness and justice. To the
ordinary person, changing rules midstream is hardly fair. This is true whether
the context is sports, academic performance, or government regulation.
Conversely, changing rules in the absence of reliance presents few fairness
concerns. Additionally, fairness concerns fall away if participants had notice
in advance of possible rule changes.
A straightforward, and highly simplified, approach to a focus on reliance
in the context of land-use controls might look like this: fairness requires that
investments based on current understandings, as reflected in existing land-use
restrictions, be protected from subsequent and unanticipated changes in the
law. Conversely, fairness does not dictate that investments made with notice
of challenged restrictions be protected.
The Court's actual position on this issue is not nearly so straightforward.
To be sure, a landowner's investment-backed reliance based on current
understandings, which are later changed, cuts in the landowner's favor,
whereas notice of the challenged restrictions prior to any reliance cuts the other
way. Yet, as a practical matter, "fairness and justice" concerns lead to a more
nuanced approach, one in which changing the rules does not usually lead to a
taking, and in which pre-acquisition notice of challenged restrictions does not
necessarily preclude a taking. The following section will examine fairness
concems when land-use restrictions are changed after reliance has occurred.
Next, it will discuss fairness concerns when an owner has notice of restrictions
prior to acquiring property.
1. Being Blindsided: Changing Rules After Reasonable and Substantial
193. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for
History's Dustbin?, 52 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 6 (2000); Mandelker, supra note 159, at
215; Oswald, supra note 179, at 116-17.
194. See, e.g., William W. Wade, Penn Central's Economic Failings Confounded Takings
Jurisprudence, 31 URB. LAW 277, 284-85 (1999).
195. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 176, at 157.
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Reliance
The first issue is the perceived fairness, or lack thereof, when government
changes the rules of the game after landowners invest in property. As noted
above, on its face, any change of rules after reliance on the old rules has
occurred might appear unfair. The trouble with that argument is that it proves
too much. Legal rules change all the time, and to a certain extent we must
expect them to do so.196 Thus, the real issue is determining when the nature of
the change becomes unfair and when should they be anticipated to some
degree as part of the give and take of economic life.
In answering that question, there are two considerations. First, the extent
and nature of the reliance on the current rules, and second, how foreseeable
were the changes. As a practical matter, the first factor is the most important
and impacts the other. Here the law, guided by "fairness and justice" concerns,
draws a sharp distinction between new restrictions that interfere with
established uses of land and restrictions that simply limit potential uses of
land.197 In the former case, where a landowner has actually developed the
property and put it to use, a very strong case can be made that interference with
such development expenditures would be unfair. Expending money for actual
land development is almost certainly the type of crystallized investment that
Penn Central intended to protect.19 8 The loss, and hence the reliance, in such
For example, zoning laws typically protect
situations is substantial.
uses
through nonconforming use and vested-rights
investments in existing
99
are
in turn particularly based on fairness concerns
of
these
Each
doctrine.1
the clear expectation that development
with
and provide landowners
activity, will be protected.
absent
nuisance-like
in
land,
expenditures
The analysis changes substantially, however, when a land-use restriction
200
This often applies to
only restricts future or potential uses of land.
196. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) ("It seems to us that
the property owner necessarily expects the use of his property to be restricted, from time to time,
by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers . . . .").
197. State and local land use law has long protected established uses from new regulations
by granting non-conforming use status to such uses. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL.,
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 356-58 (7th ed.

2008) (noting land-use law generally recognizes a right to continue non-conforming uses).
Vested rights doctrine also protects land uses in the process of being established, but not yet
complete. This also is grounded in the recognized need to protect substantial reliance in land-use
development. See ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 6.20-6.34 (Kenneth H. Young,
ed., 4h ed. 1996).
198. Although the Court in Penn Central did not necessarily limit this factor to
interferences with established uses, the Court apparently got the phrase "interference with
distinct, investment-backed expectations" from an article by Professor Frank Michelman. In
discussing the concept, the Michelman article primarily emphasized its relevance to interferences
with established uses. See Michelman, supra note 147, at 1233-34.
199. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 846-49 (6th ed. 2006).

200. See Freyfogle, supra note 32, at 134 ("In the law of takings, a considerable difference
exists between a regulation that interferes with a current land use and one that bans a prospective
land use."). See also John A. Humbach, Law andaNew Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REv. 339, 365-
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undeveloped land where property is downzoned prior to any development on
the land. For example, land that is first zoned high-density residential or
commercial and is later downzoned to agricultural will result in prohibiting
most development. 201 Even here protecting reasonable expectations are
important, but such expectations are themselves necessarily shaped by legal
rules surrounding property and in particular the possibility of regulation. Not
only is the degree of reliance substantially less in such situations, but land-use
regulation must also be viewed as part of the "background risk and
opportunity, against which we all take our chances" as investors in land.202
For this reason, despite interfering to some degree with investmentbacked expectations, restrictions on future uses of land are not inherently
unfair.203 However, this is not to say restrictions on future use are never unfair,
a possibility that the Penn Central test anticipates. In more extreme
instances-and when combined with other factors such as economic impactinterference with even future uses might be viewed as significantly unfair and
require just compensation.
In this regard, there are three possible regulatory scenarios that concern
the timing of regulations as they relate to development opportunities and the
perceived fairness or unfairness of restrictions on land development. The first
scenario occurs when restrictions on property with low development potential
result in modest diminution in value. Such a restriction poses little or no
perceived unfairness because the economic impact is minor. Moreover, there
is no real interference with investment expectations because development
potential is low. Even if subsequent events substantially enhance the
development potential of the land, there is still no unfairness if the restrictions
were imposed before the land appreciated in value and the owner is seeking an
upzoning to a more intensive land use. Although refusal to upzone in such a
situation might result in significant loss of potential appreciated value for the
landowner, this loss is hardly an unfair interference with investment-backed
expectations.204
A second regulatory scenario occurs when property is acquired with lowdevelopment potential, which later substantially appreciates in value before the
restrictions are imposed. Unlike the first scenario, a likely consequence of
such a restriction is a substantial diminution in value. Moreover, such a
restriction would constitute a deprivation of preexisting and valuable
development opportunities. Taken together, these factors might suggest the
66 (1989) (arguing that government restrictions should constitute a taking only when interfering
with potential uses of property).
201. See generally Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 25 (N.J. 1991) (holding
that the restriction of plaintiffs land to agricultural use was not a taking); Wilson v. Cnty. of
McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (same).
202. Michelman, supra note 161, at 415.
203. See supra Part Ill.
204. See, e.g., Cnty. of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994, 997 (Idaho 1983); Harvard State Bank
v. Cnty. of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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restrictions are unfair.
Despite these concerns, in most instances the interference with investment
expectations is neither unfair nor likely to constitute a taking. As in Penn
Central, the original investment reflects low development potential-the
downzoning only interferes with opportunities subsequent to the investment.
The lost appreciated value does not so much reflect the investment of the
landowner as a fortuitous windfall from advancing development, much of it
even created by government itself through government infrastructure and other
types of givings. 205 Although downzoning in such a situation clearly has an
economic impact on the affected landowner, it does not amount to the type of
unfair treatment that causes takings concerns. Indeed, Penn Central itself
essentially involved this same scenario, in which previously permitted
development was eliminated, resulting in significant economic impact, but not
interfering with what had been the original expectation of the property
owner. 206
A third regulatory scenario is where someone purchases land at a price
reflecting permitted development opportunities, which is subsequently
downzoned resulting in substantial economic loss. Unlike the second scenario,
in which the land appreciated in value after purchase, here, the price itself
reflects the full value of the land. Indeed, this might occur as a simple
variation on the previous scenario with the original owner selling the property
before, rather than after, restrictions are imposed.
Fairness concerns are perhaps most pronounced in this scenario.
Arguably, in such situations the landowner's investment expectations are
backed by the full purchase price and the owner is being blindsided by placing

205. See supra Part Ill.A.
206. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (stating
there was no interference with investment-backed expectations because the property could be
used as it had been for the previous sixty-five years). For a more recent case applying a similar
analysis, see Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Burgess, 772 So.2d 540, 543-44
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that denial of a dredge and fill permit for wetlands did not
constitute a taking, since the wetlands in question were purchased in 1956 for recreational
purposes, and denial of the permit did not interfere with continued recreational use of the
property).
Penn Central's minimization of takings concerns in this second scenario might be criticized by
focusing on the original investment, rather than the development potential and value immediately
before the restriction was imposed. The argument goes that by choosing to retain rather than sell
such assets, the owner has in essence reinvested in the land at the higher value. See Wade, supra
note 195, at 301. Thus, the determination of interference with investment-backed expectations
should use a later, not earlier time frame.
There is some force to this argument, but it is far from compelling, especially when seen from a
broader perspective. As discussed in Part IlA, much of the appreciated value in such situations
is typically not the result of actual investments by the landowner, but from fortuitous windfalls
from advancing development, usually supported by government givings. Also, as noted by John
Echeverria, "[S]o long as the owner has been able to exploit the property for an extended period
for its original use, it is difficult to see how 'investment-backed' expectations can be said to have
been frustrated." Echeverria, supra note 14, at 185.
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new restrictions on the property-at least when it results in a substantial
diminution in value.
Though these fairness concerns are real to a certain extent, they are
tempered by several factors. First and most significantly is the concept of
"regulatory risk," an idea that helps inform the reasonableness of any
investment-backed expectation. The Supreme Court recognized this concept in
Lucas, when it stated, "[T]hat the property owner necessarily expects the uses
of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers." 207 This
analysis builds on statements by the Court in other regulatory contexts in
which it has strongly affirmed the idea that the risk of regulation is part of
economic life, including the distinct possibility of economic loss. 208 The Court
has noted this is particularly true with regard to activities that have "long been
the source of public concern and the subject of government regulation."209
This is certainly true of the land development field, which has long been
subject to government regulation and, if anything, the trend is toward greater
controls. 210
For this reason, reasonable investment expectations of property, no matter
at what stage the property is purchased, must necessarily include the possibility
that tighter restrictions might be enacted thus depriving the owner of previous
development opportunities and resulting in a diminution of property value. 2 11
As a practical matter, purchase prices should accordingly be discounted by the
possibility of regulation. Similarly, at least with undeveloped land, any
development expectations should be viewed as contingent at best, with the
possibility that government might subsequently change previous zoning in
order to further legitimate public interests.
If taken to an extreme, of course, the idea of "regulatory risk" would
make all restrictions constitutional because landowners could have anticipated
the possibility of such restrictions and adjusted accordingly. "Fairness and
justice" would not be served by such a position and Supreme Court precedent
does not support it. 212 In limited situations restrictions on future land uses
207. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
208. The Court has often stated that "[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot
object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative
end." Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958); Concrete Pipe Products of
Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting
Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986)
(quoting Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91).
209. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984).
210. MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 197, at 222-226 (discussing the growth and

complexity of land-use controls).
211. A number of commentators have
playing a significant role in takings analysis.
Michelman, supra note 161, at 415.
212. Although the Court has recognized
"regulatory taking," consistently affirmed by

also recognized the idea of "regulatory risk" as
Mandelker, supra note 159, at 233-36. See, e.g.,
the idea of regulatory risk, the very possibility of a
the Court since Pennsylvania Coal, indicates that
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might constitute a taking.
In such a situation, two other factors might come into play to further
refine the extent to which a landowner might have been "blindsided" despite
the possibility of regulatory risk. First is whether purchase of the land was
based on government assurances that it would continue to be available for
development only to have government later decide otherwise. This truly
represents being "blindsided" by government and, if coupled with significant
economic loss, arguably constitutes a regulatory taking.2 13
The second refining factor is the extent to which changing the rules might
have been anticipated. As noted above, land ownership is a highly regulated
activity and always carries with it regulatory risk. But, there is no doubt that
certain regulatory risks are more easily anticipated than others and that should
be considered when assessing the "fairness and justice" of new restrictions.
For example, anyone owning farmland near a metropolitan area should
anticipate, given the focus on farmland preservation today and the conversion
pressure such land is under, the distinct possibility that the land might be zoned
agricultural. In the highly regulated land development field, this is an easily
anticipated restriction and should rarely come as a true surprise.2 14
However, some restrictions on property might come as more of a surprise.
For example, the discovery of an endangered species, which thereby precludes
destruction of its habitat by development, will undoubtedly come as a surprise
to a landowner. Although the Endangered Species Act is not a newly enacted
law, the restriction itself would be new based on the discovery of a species.
This is the type of regulatory risk that a landowner does not anticipate; as a
result, she is being blindsided to some extent. 2 15 However, this does not
necessarily mean a regulatory taking has occurred. But, if the landowner had
paid a large amount of money based on current development opportunities only
to be denied those opportunities because of an unanticipated restriction, some
legitimate fairness concerns are raised. To determine if this example
constitutes a regulatory taking it must be balanced against the other Penn
Centralfactors.

Aside from such unusual cases, most regulatory interferences with future
or potential land uses raise modest or minimal "fairness and justice" concerns.
resort to "regulatory risk" to justify new land-use restrictions must have some limits. See, e.g.,
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
213. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 176, at 160-61.
214. It is true that landowners who have held farmland for a long time, perhaps generations,

might not anticipate the recent focus on farmland preservation and the increased use of
agricultural zoning. But such long-time owners would almost certainly fall under the second
regulatory scenario discussed in the text, where the owner acquired the property with lower
development potential, and the substantial increase in value occurred later. As discussed in the
text, fairness concerns are more minimal in such situations.
215. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings

and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 360-361 (1997) (stating that the discovery of an
endangered species is "akin to an Act of God").
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Interference with the actual investment of property is often minimal, and where
the interference is more substantial, the presence of regulatory risk must
discount it. On the other hand, regulations that interfere with actual
development expenditures raise substantial "fairness and justice" concerns.
Not only is the reliance far more substantial in such cases, but landowners can
also legitimately anticipate that once actual development expenditures have
occurred, government will not change the rules on them.
2. The Other Side of the Equation: Buying With Notice
The previous section discussed "fairness and justice" concerns when
newly enacted regulations interfere with a property owner's investment-backed
expectations. This section concerns the opposite scenario, when the owner
challenging a restriction acquired the property with full knowledge of a
restriction. At first glance this might seem like an easy analysis with few
fairness concerns present. If "regulatory risk" is enough to mitigate many
fairness concerns, as suggested in the previous section, then "regulatory
certainty" should dispel them altogether. On the surface it seems fair and just
to enforce land-use restrictions that an owner had notice of at the time of
purchase.
Indeed, for a number of years a substantial majority of lower court cases
took that very position, stating that acquiring property after a restriction was in
place precluded challenging the restriction as a taking.2 16 In doing so, some
courts held that prior notice of a regulation fatally undermined any investmentbacked expectations under Penn Central, reasoning that knowledge of a
restriction obviously limited development expectations. 2 17 Other courts,
relying on Lucas, held that restrictions on property existing at the time of
purchase constituted "background principles of law" under Lucas, and thus the
"bundle of rights" acquired by a landowner did not include the right to
development.21 8 Either way, the conclusion was the same: notice of a
regulation precluded bringing a takings challenge.
As noted in Part II, the Supreme Court rejected that position in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island,holding that acquiring property with a restriction in place did

216. See, e.g., Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hunziker v. State, 519
N.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Iowa 1994); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 291 (N.H.
1984); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (N.Y. 1997). See generally
R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify
the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U.

ENVTL. L.J. 449, 461-67, 483-95 (2001) (discussing how lower courts almost always preclude
takings when landowner acquired property with notice of a regulation).
217. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Forest
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Claridge, 485 A.2d at
291.
218. See, e.g., Hunziker, 519 N.W.2d at 370-71; Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997); Wooten v. S.C. Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716,
717-18 (S.C. 1999); City of Va. Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417-18 (Va. 1998).
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not preclude challenging the restriction as a taking.2 19 In so holding, the Court
stressed two points. First, it said a notice rule would in effect put an expiration
date on the Takings Clause. 220 Second, and more importantly, the Court
emphasized that rejection of the notice rule was necessary to protect owners at
the time a restriction was imposed; otherwise, they would essentially lose the
right to transfer the property at any reasonable value.221
In essence, the Court's rejection of a categorical notice rule was
predicated upon "fairness and justice," but fairness to the owner at the time a
restriction was imposed rather than fairness to the person challenging the
restriction. To hold that notice precludes a takings challenge would be unfair
to owners at the time a regulation is imposed because it effectively deprives
them of a central right of ownership-4he right to transfer. Nor can owners at
the time the restriction is imposed simply bring the takings claim themselves
because the ripeness doctrine requires concrete development proposals before a
takings claim can be brought. 222
The Court's holding that notice does not preclude a taking was qualified,
again for reasons of fairness, by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.
Although O'Connor joined the majority opinion, she stated that notice of a
restriction could continue to play a role in assessing the degree of interference
with investment-backed expectations under Penn Central. To O'Connor, it
would be equally wrong to make notice dispositive or to ignore it altogether.
Rather, she interpreted the majority opinion as "restor[ing] balance" to the
inquiry regarding investment-backed expectations, in which notice of
restrictions, though no longer dispositive, remains a factor. She supported this
position by reference to the "concepts of 'fairness and justice' that underlie the
Takings Clause," which is best achieved by consideration of all
circumstances.223 A close reading of the dissenting opinions indicates that all
four dissenters believed that, at a minimum, notice should at least be a factor in
applying the Penn Central test.224 Thus, notice of a restriction at the time
property is acquired does not preclude a takings challenge, but neither is it
irrelevant in assessing interference with investment-backed expectations under
219. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627-30 (2001).
220. See id. at 625-27.

221. See id. at 627 (stating that this would be "a critical alteration to the nature of property"
because it would effectively deprive the owner of the power to transfer the property).
222. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 351(1986);
Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
223. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633-35.

224. Justice Stevens, while concurring in the majority's ripeness analysis, dissented from
the judgment, and in particular from the Court's rejection of the notice rule. See id. at 642.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dissented on ripeness grounds, but in a
footnote at the end of her opinion stated that if the claim were ripe, she would "at a minimum
agree with Justice O'Connor . . . that transfer of title can impair a takings claim." See id at 654
n.3. Justice Breyer also wrote a short, separate dissent expressing his agreement with Justice
O'Connor on the principle that notice should neither preclude a claim on the one hand, nor be
altogether irrelevant on the other. See id.at 654-55.
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Penn Central.225
C. The Character of the Government Action: Distributional Fairness and

"Ganging Up"
The third Penn Central factor is the character of the government action.
As originally stated in Penn Central,the purpose of this factor was to draw a
distinction between physical invasions and regulations of property. 22 6 In this
regard the Court was simply recognizing that whereas physical invasions are
almost inevitably a taking,227 merely regulating the use of property is less
likely to be a taking; indeed, most regulations are accepted as part of our
nation's economic life.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that this factor is also
to apply when analyzing whether a regulation constitutes a taking. In other
words, the factor serves not just to distinguish physical invasions from
regulations, as intended by Penn Central,but also to assess whether the cost of
a regulation should be borne by a landowner or the public. This was indicated
in Palazzolo when the Court stated:
Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may
have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the
regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which
the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government action. 228
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra reaffirmed that courts are to consider the
character of the government action when analyzing whether a regulation
constitutes a taking.229
As was true of the second factor, however, the Court has given only
sparse guidance on how a court is to go about assessing the character of a
particular regulation. 230 This Article advocates that this assessment should
225. See Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(applying O'Connor's analysis); K & K Constr. v. Dep't of Envir. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 382
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (applying O'Connor's analysis); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan,
734 N.W.2d 623, 638 (Minn. 2007) (applying O'Connor's analysis).
226. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
227. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946).
228. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.
229. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321,
342 (2002) (affirming use of Penn Central for deciding most regulatory takings cases).
230. For articles exploring what considerations might be included as part of the character of
the government action prong of Penn Central, see Meltz, supra note 1, at 341-46; Echeverria,
supra note 14, at 186-99; Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the
Governmental Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. HAw. L. REv. 437
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clearly be done with an eye to "fairness and justice." In that light, there are
two general aspects of government actions that arguably bear on the core
concerns of "fairness and justice." The first is the purpose of the government
action, and the second is the breadth or narrowness of those impacted by the
regulation. Both aspects of government land regulation are discussed below.
This Article argues that the purpose of a regulation should not be considered in
evaluating the "fairness and justice" of a regulation but the breadth or
narrowness of a regulation is a particularly important consideration in terms of
"justice and fairness."
1. The Purpose of the Regulation

One potential basis to assess the "fairness and justice" of a government
regulation from a takings perspective is the purpose served by the regulation.
Any government regulation must at a minimum be "legitimate." 23 1 Arguably,
the relative strength or nature of the regulatory purpose should be a
consideration in whether a regulatory taking has occurred. Indeed, lower
courts have on occasion suggested that a particularly important government
interest might insulate a regulation from a takings challenge, or at least be an
important component of the Penn Central balancing test.232
One possible approach when using the purpose of a regulation to
determine "fairness and justice" is to draw a distinction between regulations
designed to prevent harms, which never constitute takings, and regulations
designed to bestow benefits, which might be a taking if there is substantial
diminution in value and a lack of reciprocity of advantage. This approach first
emerged in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal, where he argued
that the challenged statute was not a taking because it was designed to prevent
what was in effect nuisance-like activity. 233 Brandeis acknowledged that the
statute lacked the "reciprocity of advantage" commonly seen with other landuse regulations, but reasoned that reciprocity was only necessary when a
regulation bestowed benefits, rather than preventing harm. 234 The majority did
not necessarily dispute Brandeis's harm-benefit distinction, but it simply
rejected characterization of the statute as preventing a nuisance. 235
A similar approach was also voiced by then Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Penn Central. Rehnquist stated that the Court's prior takings precedent had
rejected takings challenges in two types of cases: either (1) where the law was
designed to prevent a nuisance or (2) where the law bestowed benefits but was
supported by substantial reciprocity of advantage. 236 He characterized the
(2007).
231. It should be noted that within this vast category there are different levels of importance
and different social objectives to be achieved.
232. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
233. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417-19 (1922) (Brandeis J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 420-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 413-14.
236. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 143-46 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Landmark Law not as preventing a harm, but rather bestowing benefits on
237
surrounding property.23
Moreover, because the law targeted only isolated
properties instead of applying comprehensively to a district, it lacked the
reciprocity of advantage that accompanies normal zoning restrictions. 238
As suggested by Brandeis and Rehnquist, this preventing a harmbestowing a benefit distinction arguably has some support in early Supreme
Court caselaw. 239 Importantly, from a "fairness and justice" perspective the
preventing a harm-bestowing a benefit approach has enormous intuitive
appeal. Because no one has the right to harm the public or cause a nuisance,
there is nothing unfair with denying compensation when a regulation is
designed to stop such activity. Similarly, even if a regulation is forcing some
landowners to bestow a benefit to the public, fairness concerns might be
adequately addressed by the presence of substantial reciprocity of advantage,
which offset to some degree the harsher regulatory impacts. But where a
regulation is neither designed to prevent harms nor provides substantial
reciprocity, then fairness begins to point in the direction of compensation.
The Supreme Court, however, largely rejected the harm-benefit approach
in Lucas. The Court noted, notwithstanding some language in early cases
focusing on harmful or noxious uses, 240 whether a particular regulation is
preventing a harm or bestowing a benefit is largely in the eye of the beholder
and too easily manipulated to be characterized as one or the other. As an
example, the Court noted that the coastal preservation law in Lucas itself could
be described either way:
It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the
ecological, economic, and esthetic concerns that inspired the South
Carolina Legislature in the present case. One could say that
imposing a servitude on Lucas's land is necessary in order to prevent
his use of it from 'harming' South Carolina's ecological resources;
or, instead, in order to achieve the "benefits" of an ecological

237. See id. at 145-46.
238. See id. at 147-49.
239. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (holding a government order to
destroy diseased trees to prevent infecting surrounding area not a taking); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (holding an ordinance prohibiting manufacture of bricks in a
residential area not a taking even though it reduced the value of land from $800,000 to $60,000);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (holding a Kansas statute prohibiting
manufacture of intoxicating liquors valid despite losses to owners because they are "not
permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community."). See also
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (holding that a prohibition of continued
operation of a quarry in a residential area not a taking despite significant economic impact);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1039-41 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that since the statute in Lucas was designed to prevent a serious harm, it was not a
taking).
240. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.
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preserve.2 41
To a large extent the Court in Lucas eliminated considerations of whether
the challenged regulation was aimed at preventing harms or bestowing
benefits." 242 However, if the regulation is designed to prevent a common law
nuisance then its harm-preventing nature remained relevant to the Court's
analysis. The Court stated that such regulations could never constitute a taking
because such a use was never part of the landowner's title to begin with. 243 As
such, deprivation of the use can hardly be characterized as unfair and should
even be expected. The Court was clear that such a nuisance exception to
regulatory takings was predicated on what the common law considers a
nuisance and cannot be redefined by a legislative body simply asserting that a
law is designed to prevent great harm or nuisances.24 4 The Court stated:
A law or a decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts - by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons)
under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complimentary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally, or otherwise.2 45
As a result, Lucas largely precludes disposing of takings claims by simply
characterizing them as preventing harms or bestowing benefits. The question
remains whether some consideration can still be given to the relative
importance of the government action in the takings analysis. One can certainly
argue that the relative strength or weakness of the asserted government interest
should still be a factor in assessing the fairness of regulatory burdens.
Arguably, landowners should be more willing to bear regulatory costs when
substantial or compelling interests are at stake because it may seem more "fair
and just" to require individual sacrifice in such situations.
The trouble with that approach is it ignores the conceptual basis of the
Takings Clause and the reasons that it is distinct from substantive due process.
The Takings Clause is not about the strength or wisdom of government
regulatory actions, but rather who should bear the costs of such regulation.
Thus, although it might be argued that landowners should be more willing to
accept economic impacts that serve important or compelling interests, it can
241. Id. at 1024.
242. But see Echeverria, supra note 14, at 195 (suggesting that Lucas did not eliminate
harm-benefit distinction in all applications).
243. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-29.
244. See id. at 1030-31.
245. Id. at 1029. Some lower courts have interpreted the "character of the government
action" factor of Penn Central as simply examining whether the challenged regulation prevents
the would-be nuisance under state law. See, e.g., Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
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equally be argued that society should be more willing to pay for such important
Indeed, from the government's
interests through just compensation.
perspective the increasing importance of a land-use control should make it
more, not less, willing to bear the cost of the restriction.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has stated that an important
government interest is not a sufficient reason to forego compensation
otherwise deserved. For example, in Pennsylvania Coal the Court stated "a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change." 24 6 Similarly, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the

Court rejected the Commission's argument that "the public interest would be
served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast," of
which the Nollan's property was an essential part.247 The Court noted that
while that may be true, it does not follow that the Nollans should bear the
cost. 2 48 Indeed, as the Court stressed in Lingle, the Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause assumes that the challenged government action is for a
public use. However, that does not preclude the need for just compensation
when government takes, or functionally takes, private property through
regulation.24 9
2. Distributional Fairness and Reciprocity of Advantage
A second consideration under the character of the government action
factor, and one of considerable importance in terms of "fairness and justice," is
the distributional aspects of land-use restrictions. This means how broadly or
narrowly the burdens of a particular regulation are distributed throughout
society. The Armstrong mantra itself points strongly to the "ganging up"
principle, stating that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent
government from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 250
In Lingle, the Court stressed distributional concerns as an important
component of the takings analysis. In rejecting the use of the "substantially
advances" test in takings analysis, the Court noted that the test failed to address
concerns central to the "fairness and justice" inquiries of the Takings Clause:
In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above,
246. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
247. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
248. Id.
249. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). See also, Friedenburg
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 3 A.D.3d 86, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (stating that a
strong public purpose does not excuse government from paying just compensation for otherwise
regulatory taking).
250. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For a discussion of how the
Armstrong principle implicates distributive justice concerns, and a short exploration of how
traditional understandings of distributive justice might be applied to takings analysis, see Gaba,
supra note 1.
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the "substantially advances" inquiry reveals nothing about the
magnitude or characterof the burden a particular regulation imposes

upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information
about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners. 25 1
This indicates that distributional concerns coupled with the magnitude and
character of the burden are central to Takings Clause analysis, which make it
distinct from substantive due process. 252
Such a focus on the distributional impacts of a regulation closely relates
to notions of "fairness and justice." Equality of treatment is fundamental to
our notions of justice and distributional concerns resonate with fairness. 253
People are often willing to make sacrifices so long as others make similar ones.
But uneven distribution of burdens and benefits often strike us as unfair,
especially for those similarly situated.
This is not to say that the Takings Clause demands broad and equal
distribution of regulatory burdens. Far from it, results in both Supreme Court
and lower court takings cases make it abundantly clear that disproportionate
concentrations are not only the norm in such cases, but also quite acceptable.
The Court recognized this in Tahoe-Sierra when it tweaked the Armstrong
mantra to say:
The concepts of 'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, we
have eschewed 'any "set formula" for determining when "justice and
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be
by the government, rather than remain
compensated
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'254
This statement implicitly recognizes that land-use regulations will
typically be "disproportionately concentrated on a few people," and the
"fairness and justice" inquiry seeks to determine when that norm should be
rejected.
Thus, distributional concerns are an important component of "fairness and
251. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
252. Nester Davidson has written about the recent emergence of equality as a primary
theme in takings jurisprudence. He sees this as being "reflected in three related and overlapping
concepts: the so-called Armstrong principle, generality as an analytical variable, and the question
of average reciprocity of advantage." Davidson, supra note 14, at 20. Davidson goes on to
criticize the emerging emphasis on equality as inconsistent with takings fundamentals. See id. at
37-49.
253. See Gaba, supra note 1, at 576 ("One concept stands at the center of an evaluation of
distributive justice; it is the concept of equality.").
254. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336
(2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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justice," but they are hardly dispositive. 255 Not only must they be held in
balance with the other factors, but it is also assumed that any government
regulation has some disproportionate impacts. Therefore, the issue is when
disproportionate impacts transform from acceptable to problematic.
The Supreme Court itself has most commonly addressed distributional
takings issues through the idea of reciprocity of advantage. 25 6 This refers to
the idea that land-use regulations not only impose burdens, but also create
benefits, with the benefits offsetting or partially offsetting the burdens. As
discussed in Part III.B, regulatory reciprocity can be viewed from both a
general and specific perspective. This is one reason why, from a "big picture"
perspective, land-use restrictions that impose significant economic costs on
landowners are not inherently unfair.
The Supreme Court has typically viewed reciprocity through a narrower
lens, considering the reciprocal burdens and benefits that a particular land-use
control may generate. Its attention to the concept has been sporadic
emphasizing it in some cases while completely ignoring it in others. As a
general matter, the Court has at times recognized the presence of reciprocity of
advantage as a significant rationale as why many land-use restrictions do not
constitute takings. However, the Court is less clear on how to handle the
absence of reciprocity and is far from consistent in evaluating the extent to
which reciprocity might exist.257
The idea of reciprocity of advantage first appeared in Pennsylvania
Coal,258 where the Court distinguished the restriction under review from the
restriction considered in Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania. In Plymouth Coal,

the Court upheld a requirement that pillars of coal be left next to adjacent
properties to avoid subsidence along boundaries. 25 9 Because the restriction in
Plymouth Coal applied to owners on both sides of adjacent property, the Court
indicated that it generated reciprocity of advantage, something absent in the

255. See generally Gaba, supra note I (discussing how theories of and approaches to
"distributive justice" might apply to the takings issue).
256. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980); Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147-49 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Davidson, supra note 14, at 20 (noting how reciprocity of advantage intersects
with Armstrong principle).
257. See William W. Wade & Robert L. Bunting, Average Reciprocity of Advantage:
"Magic Words" or Economic Reality-Lessons From Palazzolo, 39 URB. LAW. 319, 319 (2007)

("Average reciprocity of advantage (ARA) is a legal term of art without a settled definition, a
phrase more vexing to regulatory takings than the Penn Central test. ARA means nothing outside
the narrow confines of land use law. Even within the practice of land use law, Supreme Court
and lower court decisions have obscured rather than clarified the concept."). See also DANA &
MERRILL, supra note

176, at

154 ("[A]verage

reciprocity

. . . is open to multiple

interpretations.").
258. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
259. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540 (1914).
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statute challenged in Pennsylvania Coal.260 Although the absence of
reciprocity of advantage was not the deciding factor in PennsylvaniaCoal, the
Court seemed to suggest that the presence of substantial reciprocity of
advantage may have justified the regulation.
In several subsequent cases, the Court has used notions of reciprocity of
advantage to justify, at least partly, a regulation in the face of a takings
challenge. For example, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court upheld a zoning
regulation that limited residential development to single-family homes on lots
between one and five-acres.2 61 In rejecting a taking challenge, the Court noted
that the regulation provided reciprocity of advantage to landowners because all
property in the immediate vicinity had the same restriction.26 2 The Court again
made reference to reciprocity of advantage in Keystone, where it recognized
the role of reciprocity of advantage in legitimizing land-use restrictions:
Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of
preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can
make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by
such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly by the restrictions
placed on others. 263
Thus, reciprocity concerns how regulatory burdens and benefits are
distributed throughout society. In assessing the "fairness and justice" of such
distributions, there are two factors that should be considered. First, the degree
to which the challenged regulation creates reciprocal benefits to burdened
landowners. Both Pennsylvania Coal and Agins assume that some real and
significant reciprocal benefits often accompany regulatory burdens. When such
reciprocal benefits are apparent or presumed, they mitigate fairness concerns.
Fairness does not require that reciprocal benefits equal or exceed burdens
imposed.264 However, regulations that impose significant burdens with little or

260. The Court stated:
It is true that in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, it was held competent for the

legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left along the line of adjoining property, that,
with the pillar on the other side of the line, would be a barrier sufficient for the safety
of the employees of either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to
fill with water. But that was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the
mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a
justification of various laws.
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (citation omitted).
261. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
262. Id.
263. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
264. See Dagan, supra note 143, at 771-73 (stating that the reciprocity of advantage should
not require benefits that fully offset burdens). But see Wade & Bunting, supra note 257, at 32324 (arguing that reciprocity of advantage, properly understood, should require benefits that fully
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no reciprocal benefits are less likely to be viewed as fair.
The second consideration in assessing distributional fairness-one that
somewhat determines the first-is the breadth or narrowness of the regulatory
action. 265 Broad-based regulations are more likely to generate reciprocal
benefits that partially offset regulatory burdens.266 Beyond that, however,
broad-based regulations seem inherently more fair because burdens, though
perhaps substantial, are spread among large numbers of parties. In such
situations restrictions are more likely to be seen as one's "fair share." In
contrast, targeting only a few landowners for regulatory burdens creates a
perception that a few owners are forced to carry the brunt of a regulatory
burden to benefit others. Not only is political recourse more difficult in such
circumstances, 267 but, as noted above, the paucity of other regulated parties
diminishes the likelihood of substantial reciprocal benefits. Consequently,
there is a sense of "ganging up" in which a few are burdened for the benefit of
the many.
This is at times called the generality requirement, 268 and seems to be
central to the Armstrong notions of fairness and justice. The oft-repeated quote
from Armstrong itself centers its conception of "fairness and justice" on this
concern, stating that the Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 26 9 Lingle also reiterated this
distributional focus, emphasizing that the Takings Clause concerns both the
magnitude and character of burdens, as well as how such burdens are
distributed across society. 270 Indeed, members of the Court as well as
offset burdens).
265. See R & Y, Inc. v. Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001), which summarized judicial
consideration of reciprocity of advantage as follows:
These decisions aspire ultimately to allocate economic burdens and benefits fairly and
will find an allocation fair when the disputed regulation: (1) applies broadly to many
landowners; (2) directly benefits those that it burdens; and (3) permits burdened
landowners to engage in viable alternative economic uses of their land.
Id. at 298-99.
266. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
267. One rationale for the Takings Clause is that it is necessary to protect some political
minorities-i.e., a limited set of property owners-from majoritarian excesses. For a summary
and criticism of this position see Davidson, supra note 14, at 37-44.
268. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("We have, therefore, in our takings law frequently looked to the generality of a
regulation."). Lower courts and commentators have also recognized the importance of generality.
See, e.g., Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007) ("[AJn
important consideration involves whether the regulation is general in application or whether the
burden of the regulation falls disproportionately on relatively few property owners."); Davidson,
supra note 14, at 22; Meltz, supra note 1, at 346.
269. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
270. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
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commentators have often emphasized the generality of a regulation, or lack
therefore, as an important consideration in the takings inquiry.271
Application of focus on the breadth or narrowness of the regulation will at
times be easy to apply. For example, typical zoning ordinances-where
restrictions are applied comprehensively throughout a district-are clearly
broad and general, essentially applying the same restriction on a large number
of parties.272 No owner, or small group of owners, is singled out and burdens
are distributed broadly. Moreover, in such situations the same group of owners
burdened by the restriction is also the primary group benefitted. This
substantial symmetry between those burdened and benefitted adds to
perceptions of fairness because a few owners are not being burdened largely
for the benefit of others. 273 At the other extreme would be instances where one
landowner, or a small group of landowners, is singled out from a larger group
of those similarly situated in order to carry large burdens for the broader class.
For example, if a large number of landowners had property suitable for a
restriction,. but only a few were selected, this would clearly be a
disproportionate burden designed primarily to benefit others. This would
amount to unfair targeting. Not only are the burdens unfairly distributed in
such a situation, but there is little symmetry between those burdened and those
benefitted.274 In this case, an owner is burdened with almost all the benefits
271. For example, in Lucas, Justice Kennedy stated in a concurring opinion that "the State
did not act until after the property had been zoned for individual lot development and most other
parcels had been improved, throwing the whole burden of the regulation on the remaining lots.
This too must be measured in the balance." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035-36 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See also id. at 1074-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the generality of the
Beachfront Management Act in Lucas as a reason the law was not a taking as applied to Lucas);
Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 639 ("[A]n important consideration involves whether the regulation is
general in application or whether the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately on
relatively few property owners."); Echeverria, supra note 14, at 192-93; Fee, supra note 1, at
1049-56.
272. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980). See also Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fla.
Rock,18 F.3d at 1570 ("When there is reciprocity of advantage, paradigmatically in a zoning case
then the claim that Government has taken property has little force . . . .") (footnote omitted).
273. As stated by Justice Rehnquist in his Penn Central dissent:
[A]ny such . . . decrease in value will more than likely be at least partially offset by an
increase in value which flows from similar restrictions as to use on neighboring
properties. All property owners in a designated area are placed under the same
restrictions, not only for the benefit of the municipality as a whole but also for the
common benefit of one another.
Penn Central,438 U.S. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Fee, supra note 1, at 1057
(stating that takings analysis requires substantial relation between those burdened and those
benefitted by a regulation); Wade & Bunting, supra note 257, at 324, 347 (concluding equity
suggests that "beneficiaries of regulation should bear the costs.").
274. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("A 'partial taking'
occurs when a regulation singles out a few property owners to bear burdens, while benefits are
spread widely across a community.").
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going elsewhere. 275
However, characterizing regulatory burdens as broad or narrow is not
always so clear. Many land-use restrictions necessarily turn on the unique
nature or location of property. As a result, the universe of similarly situated
properties is relatively narrow to begin with. This is particularly true with
property that has environmental value, such as wetlands or coastal zones. In
such situations a restriction on all land within a class may still affect a
relatively small number of parties in a geographic area.276 On the one hand,
such a restriction is still general and broad in that it applies to all properties
that are similarly situated, rather than intentionally targeting just a few
properties for regulation.2 77 On the other hand, the number of such properties
might be relatively small within the region, surrounded mostly by properties
that do not have the restriction. Thus, unlike single-family zoning, where all
properties within an area share a common regulatory burden, here a few will be
burdened but most will not.
Even though the regulation applies broadly to all within the class, it is
easily viewed as imposing burdens on a relatively small set of landowners.
The lack of symmetry between those burdened and those benefitted by the
restrictions easily reinforces this view. 278 Unlike typical zoning ordinances,
where the group burdened is also the primary group benefitted, most of the
275. This was arguably the situation in Florida Rock v. United States where the United
States Court of Federal Claims found a taking where a wetlands regulation prohibited operation
of a quarry. The court stated:
Here, the surrounding community benefits from the wetland's filtering action,
stabilizing effect, and provision of habitat for flora and fauna. Florida Rock benefits
from being member of a community which has the potential for a better environment.
But there can be no question that Florida Rock has been singled out to bear a much
heavier burden than its neighbors, without reciprocal advantages. Limestone mines
that are still allowed to operate nearby . .. are among those who enjoy Florida Rock's
beneficence without sharing its burden. . . . Florida Rock has paid, and continues to
pay, a much higher price for its benefit than have other members of the community.
The court finds that Florida Rock's disproportionately heavy burden was not offset by
any reciprocity of advantage.
Fla. Rock v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 37 (1999).
276. See Wade & Bunting, supra note 257, at 342.
277. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1074 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for generality of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act in Lucas,
stating that it applied to all landowners within the applicable zone). See also Walcek v. United
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 270 (1999) (noting that even though the property in question was
surrounded on all four sides by unregulated land, nevertheless the wetlands regulations applied
generally to all similarly situated landowners and therefore was not directed only at the
plaintiffs); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005) (describing wetlands regulations to be like zoning regulations: "comprehensive, universal,
and ubiquitous" and thus providing reciprocity of advantage).
278. See Fee, supra note 1, at 1057-60 (arguing that Takings Clause should require
symmetry between those benefitted and those burdened, as envisioned by original understandings
of reciprocity of advantage).
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benefits of environmental controls go to broader society. For example, most of
the benefits of wetland controls, which include purifying water of
contaminants, flood control, and providing habitat for fauna and fish,279 go to
broader society. From the perspective of an affected landowner, distributional
fairness concerns may exist in such a situation because substantial burdens are
imposed primarily to create benefits going to other parties.28 0 The Supreme
Court itself has not been completely clear on how to evaluate reciprocity of
advantage, and thus distributional fairness, in such situations. Although
reciprocity is most clearly present when the same group burdened is largely the
group benefitted, the Court has on occasion suggested a more generous view of
reciprocity. This was suggested in Penn Central, where the Court construed
reciprocity quite broadly. Justice Rehnquist's dissent had argued that since the
Landmark Law in Penn Central targeted only isolated properties, it lacked the
reciprocity of advantage necessary to support the law, instead forcing a few
landowners to bestow benefits to the rest of the city. 281 The majority rejected
that view, however, instead stating that the law affected over 400 properties,
and that Penn Central, as a member of the New York community, benefitted
from the Landmark Law like everyone else.282 Thus, even though relatively
few properties were actually restricted pursuant to the law, the Court deemed
the benefits it generated accrued to Penn Central as part of the broader
community.
This expansive understanding of the reciprocity flowing from a particular
restriction can potentially justify almost any restriction. As long as the
regulation creates real benefits for society, and the burdened party as a member
of society enjoys those benefits like anyone else, the regulation meets the
reciprocity of advantage. This is sometimes referred to as "social reciprocity"
with the idea being as long as the societal benefits of a regulation are greater
than the burden imposed on landowners, reciprocity of advantage has been
satisfied.283 The trouble with this approach is that it essentially eliminates any
279. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 130, at 695.

280. See Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 640-41 (Minn. 2007)
(concluding that designating property as "Parks, Open Space and Recreation" pointed toward a
taking, since the benefits provided by the restriction "are widely shared through the community,
but the costs are focused solely on the property owner.").
281. See Penn Cent. Transp., Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Where a relatively few individual buildings, all separated from one
another, are singled out and treated differently from surrounded buildings, no such reciprocity
exists.").
282. See id at 134-35 ("Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City Council
that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both
economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole-which we are unwilling
to do-we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefitted by
the Landmarks Law.").
283. See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of
Advantage" Rules in Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1506 (1997).

Some lower courts have also applied this broad meaning of reciprocity. See K & K Constr., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) ("[Wletland regulations
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serious consideration of reciprocity of advantage and distributional fairness. 284
Although it is true that burdened landowners always receive some benefit as
part of broader society, this hardly answers whether burdens and benefits are
being distributed fairly. Rather, distributional fairness asks whether a few
landowners are forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden relative to the
benefits generated. This might occur even when the overall societal benefit is
significant. By its very nature, the distributional concerns implicit in the
Armstrong mantra, and explicitly articulated in Lingle, focus not on the overall
benefits generated by a regulation, but how the burdens have been distributed
and the reciprocal benefits generated.28 5
This is not to say that distributional fairness requires a close symmetry
between those burdened and those benefitted as some have argued. 286
Certainly, a close symmetry between those burdened and those benefitted from
a regulation is enough to avoid a taking because it essentially matches the
classic understanding of reciprocity of advantage. But, that should not mean
that when a regulation is primarily designed to benefit society as a wholemost of who are not subject to the regulation-it constitutes a taking. That
denies any sense of collective responsibility and in particular the idea of
general reciprocity and the historically limited nature of property rights
discussed in Part 1II. To be sure, lack of symmetry between those burdened
and those benefitted is less fair than when such symmetry exists, but it should
only be a consideration weighed against other concerns.
A more reasoned approach to assessing distributional fairness is to look to
a number of factors starting with the breadth of the regulation relative to those
benefitted. As noted above, the clearest case of "ganging up" is when a few

in question ... indisputably serve an important public purpose - one which benefits plaintiffs as
members of the public at large." (quoting Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 270 (2001))).
A number of commentators have also argued for such a broad interpretation of reciprocity, which
essentially insulates a restriction from a takings challenge as long as the restriction generates
substantial benefits to society. See Raymond R. Colletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and
Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REv. 297,

363-66(1990).
284. See Fee, supra note 1, at 1059 ("This line of reasoning, if taken seriously, would
unravel the entire regulatory takings doctrine . . . .").
285. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) ("The owner of property
subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out
and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation."). See also
Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (indicating strong
public purpose does not excuse government from paying just compensation for taking).
286. John Fee has argued that takings analysis should focus on the degree to which those
burdened are also those who benefit from a regulation. He states that if "a restriction on one
group of owners only makes sense because of its benefits to other non-regulated members of the
public, the restriction presents a classic case for compensation." Fee, supra note 1, at 1057.
According to Fee, that largely turns on the generality of the regulation and the number of owners
affected. He sates that "the fewer the number of regulated owners, especially where those owners
are dispersed and the effects of the regulation are severe, the more likely it is that the government
has imposed a special restriction on those owners for the primary benefit of outsiders." Id.
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landowners are targeted for restriction among a large group of similarly
situated landowners. The result is forcing a small number of individuals to
bestow benefits to the larger class. Conversely, where a large number of
similarly situated landowners are equally burdened and the benefits largely
going to the same group, there are no concerns about distributional fairness.
Even if the regulated group is relatively small, distributional fairness still
occurs when those burdened and benefitted are largely the same.
Where a restriction applies to a relatively small group of similarly situated
landowners to benefit society more generally, the focus must be more nuanced,
with three considerations in mind. First is the extent to which all similarly
situated properties carry the same restriction. Second is the magnitude of the
burden. And third is the extent to which burdened owners themselves receive
real benefits beyond those received merely as a member of society.
This last point is particularly important. Although many environmental
regulations are designed to primarily benefit broader society and neighboring
properties, rather than the regulated properties themselves, they at times
generate some significant and unique reciprocal benefits to those burdened.
For example, although the benefits of agricultural zoning largely flow to
surrounding land and society in general,287 there are some significant benefits
to the restricted farmland itself. The resulting benefits include insulating farms
from the problems of conflicting residential use, traffic problems, storm water
runoff damage to crops, and potential nuisance suits.288 Another example is
the Landmark Law in Penn Central. Although the regulation was largely
designed to benefit the city and not the burdened properties themselves, it
certainly provided some regulatory benefits to Penn Central. Those benefits
clearly fell far short of what would be required under classic reciprocity of
advantage, but nevertheless could be considered to some degree.
In the final analysis, the distributional fairness of such restrictions must be
highly fact sensitive and pursuant to a careful balance. It is important
remember that concerns about how burdens and benefits are distributed is only
one component of the broader Penn Central analysis. Not only must
distributional issues be balanced against the magnitude of the economic impact
and the degree to which the restrictions were predictable, but they must also be
seen in the broader perspective that even highly disproportionate burdens are
not inherently unfair. For the reasons discussed in Part III, most land-use
restrictions, even those imposing significant and disproportionate costs, should

287. See generally Cordes, supra note 130, at, 1041-44 (discussing societal benefits of
farmland preservation).
288. See J. Dixon Essecks & Lela M. Long, The Political Viability of Agricultural
Protection Zoning to

Prevent Premature Conversion of Farmland, in

CONFERENCE

PROCEEDINGS, PROTECTING FARMLAND AT THE FRINGE: Do REGULATIONS WORK? 79, 80-83

(Lawrence
W.
Libby
&
Charles
Abdalla
eds.,
Sept.
5-7,
2001),
http://www.farmfoundation.org/projects/01-47.pdf (discussing studies documenting variety of
problems that non-farm land uses pose to farming).
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nevertheless be viewed as inherently fair. 289 The Penn Central inquiry is
designed to identify those rare instances where "fairness and justice" require an
exception to the broad perspective of regulatory fairness and compensation be
paid.
For this reason, even where a few landowners suffer regulatory burdens to
benefit broader society, it is likely not a taking. The clearest example of when
an exception should be made and a taking found is when a landowner has
suffered a significant economic loss and "ganging up" has truly occurred. But
in other situations where a more limited number of landowners have regulatory
burdens because of the unique nature of their land such as wetlands, coastal
zones, farmland, and habitat for endangered species, the analysis is necessarily
more nuanced. Even though restrictions on such land are primarily designed to
benefit society more generally, close attention must be given to the size of the
economic impact on the parcel as a whole, the degree to which the regulation
might have "blindsided" the owner, and the extent to which some reciprocal
benefits are generated by the restriction. The totality of this inquiry might at
times point toward a regulatory taking, but that will be a rare exception to the
rule of constitutionality.
V. CONCLUSION

Despite continued ambiguity over regulatory takings doctrine, the past
decade has seen clarity in two regards. First, it is now clear that the vast
majority of regulatory takings cases will be resolved under the three-factor
Penn Central test. Apart from the loss of all economic viability-a scenario
that the Supreme Court itself has characterized as extremely rare 29 0-Penn
Central, for better or worse, now reigns supreme. Second, concerns about
"fairness and justice" have taken an even more central role in resolving takings
challenges. Fairness has long been the foundation of takings jurisprudence,
with the Court frequently invoking the Armstrong mantra as a prelude to
discussing takings law. But concomitant with the emergence of Penn Central
as the Court's primary takings tool is a new emphasis on "fairness and justice."
Indeed, the Court has indicated that one virtue of the admittedly indeterminate
Penn Central test is that it lends itself to pursuing the equally indeterminate
notion of "fairness and justice."291 At the same time, the Court has stated that
application of the Penn Central test itself must be done through the lens of
"fairness and justice. "292
"Fairness and justice" in regulatory takings must be seen from two
perspectives. Before examining the Penn Central test itself, it is important to
289. See supra Part Ill.

290. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
330 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
291. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321, 326.

292. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-618.
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understand why it is not inherently unfair to require that most regulatory costs
must be borne by landowners themselves, even in cases of extreme diminution
in property values. The "fairness and justice" of this "big picture" perspective
is justified by three rationales: (1) the idea of givings, which recognizes that a
substantial portion of land value is created by government action; (2) the idea
of general reciprocity, which recognizes that from a broader perspective
landowners are burdened by some regulations but benefitted by others; and (3)
the notion of property rights themselves, which have long viewed private
property as subject to the broader public welfare.
For this reason, the Penn Central test is best understood as designed to
identify the rare exception to the big picture balance in favor of government,
where "fairness and justice" suggest a taking has occurred. Although this
inquiry must be highly fact specific, "fairness and justice" under Penn Central
should primarily focus on three considerations: (1) the magnitude of the
economic impact; (2) the extent to which the landowner has been "blindsided"
by a regulation; and (3) the extent to which "ganging up" has occurred. The
last factor of "ganging up" comes closest to the distributive justice concerns at
the heart of the Armstrong principle itself, but the Penn Central test requires
that all these factors are balanced together. This will typically require the
convergence of several fairness concerns before a regulatory taking should be
found.

